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PART I
INTROLUCTIQN
A study of the present economic problems of Puerto Kico
should be a matter of great interest to every good American,
Not only is the Island a part of the United States, but it
can be turned into a profitable field of endeavor affording
a brilliant future to those really willing to work. The
Island is in itself beautiful, and the climate comfortable.
Generally speaking, the Island is an ideal abode for the
lovers of beauty, the ambitious, and the tired business man
who wants to spend a warm and pleasant winter.
In this thesis I will endeavor to present facts as they
appear to the best of my knowle.dge . No partisanship will
be allowed. Data will be presented with no consideration
as to which party it may favor or displease. It has been the
lack of this attitude that has done harm to a great number
of studies made of the conditions of the Island. If the
survey is done by an American, he will usually favor the
American side, and will blame all present troable in the
Island on the negligence of Puerto Paeans. Should the study
be made by a Puerto P:ican, the opposite stand is almost in-
variably taken. This does not mean, however, that all authors
who have chosen Puerto Rico for their field of study have
been prejudiced. The laudable work done by Victor S. Clark
and Associates is a good example of a truly scholarly
investigation.

Fully realizing that statistics are a more reliable
source of information than statements, I will use their
testimony in preference to the written opinions of authors.
I will only rely on the opinions of authors when unable
to obtain accurate data on the matter.
Few Americans realize the importance of Puerto Kico
as a market for their products. From a social viewpoint
citizens, and should be treated as such by their fellowmen.
If Puerto Ricans abandoned in part their individualistic
attitude, they could do much to raise their incomes and
their standards of living. 1/Vho but they themselves should be
more concerned with this? Relations between the Island and
the mainland need to be more friendly. Let the problem of
the one be the problem of the other. The visit that the
President of the United States, Franklin L». Roosevelt, has
planned to the Island will be a fine step in that direction.
It is to be hoped that he will not close his eyes to those
conditions that need to be straightened out, and will not
follow the precedent set by President Hoover. His predecessors
led him to believe that everything was in order on the
Island, when it was easy to realize that conditions were
far from rosy.
For a better understanding of this thesis, geographical
and historical data about Puerto Rico will be given in the
following chapter.
also
,
that Puerto Ricans are American
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FUEKTQ HICO
Puerto Kico is the fourth largest island of the
greater Antilles, and one of the most beautiful. The
Atlantic Ocean is on the north and the Caribbean Sea on
the south. (1) It is 1000 miles east by south of Key vVest.
Santo Domingo is about 46 miles to the west, and Saint
Thomas 40 miles to the east. Its area is 3,435 square miles.
The islands of Culebra and Vieques, to the east, form part
of the territory. The Island is nearly rectangular, about
100 miles long, and 35 miles v;ide, v/ith a coast line of
about 345 miles. (2) Its area is about three-fourths that
of Connecticut, and nearly three times as great as that of
Rhode Island, the smallest state in the Union. San Juan is
its capital vvith a population accoraing to the census of
1930 of 114,585. The capital is believed to have a population
of over 125,000 at present. Other cities of importance are
Ponce, Arecibo, and Iviayaguez.
The best harbors are at San Juan, Ponce, Guanica and
Mayaguez. The pier very recently completed at Mayagilez is a
fine achivement, and is proving to be of great benefit to
the trade of the western part of the Island. Through the
middle of the Island runs a range of mountains fi-om east to
west, with an altitude of from 1,500 to 3,750 feet, which
(1) American Educator, P. 2911
(2) Clark and Associates, Porto Rico & Its Problems. P. 1
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may be cultivated to the very summits. (3) The highest peaks
of the central range of mountains are El Yunque, 3,543 feet
and Pico de Jayuya, 4,3;:)8 feet in altitude. (4)
The land slopes to the north and south with the north
being well watered, and the south needing irrigation. The
rivers, though small and unnavigable, are very important
as a water supply. Their rapid waters are said to hide small
amounts of gold dust, but in such insignificant quantities
that not even the high price now offered for gold due to
President Roosevelt's gold buying policy is enough to
encourage one to look for it. The important rivers on the
north coast are the Bayamon., , the Loiza, La Plata, kanati,
and Tanama rivers. On the south is the Guayan^s, and on the
west the Blanco. The soil is very fertile and practically all
under cultivation. Sugar, fruits, tobacco, and coffee are the
leading crops in quantity and value.
The flora and fauna of Puerto Kico have changed much
since its discovery, but they do not aiffer greatly from
those in other islands in the tropics. It is interesting to
notice that no dangerous animals exist there, unless brought
by a circus. Rainfall comes in short, sharp showers, which
aggregate much water. Lue to the impervious character of the
soil, these showers cause the mountains' streams to rise
(3) Ibid P. 2.
(4) Thirty-third Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto
Rico, 1933, P. 116.
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very suddenly after a heavy rainfall, and turn sti-eams into
rivers v/hich endanger the life of people and animals, and
cause the destruction of property. Hurricanes are the grea-
test destroyers of property and life. San Ciprian, famous
hurricane, was the latest to rip its way through the Island.
(5) They may come as often as several in a year, or wait
a quarter of a century witnout touching the Island. The
crop damage done is the greatest loss, especially in those
crops where it takes several years to plant ana have plants
bear fruits. Earthquakes are not so frequent, and are
decidedly less destructive than hurricanes.
HISTORY OF PUERTO PJCQ
Puerto Rico was discovered by Columbus on his second
voyage to America on I\'ovember 19, 1493. He named the Island
after San Juan Bautista. (6) Ponce de Leon conquered it
for Spain in 1509-11, enslaved the natives, and within the
next few decades almost all of them had died under his
rigorous rule, Negrous were then brought in to work in the
fields. The Island was attacked on various occasions by
the Dutch, English and Americans. Puerto Rico also made
several minor attempts at revolt, deserving special mention
(5) Thirty-third Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto
Rico, 1933, P. 1.
(6) American Educator P. 2911.
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that of 1857 when the well known cry, "El grito de Ciales"
was heard. Later it was made a province of Spain ana allowea
representation in the national parliament, but this repre-
sentation was to be short lived. After eleven years it was
ended.
Luring the Spanish American War, Puerto Hico w-ls
attacked and partially conquered by Major-General Miles.
Latfer-, as a result of the Treaty of Paris it was ceded to
the United States on Lecember-.IO, 1898.
By the Act of 1917, Puerto Ricans were given full rights
as citizens of the United States, but citizenship was not
made obligatory.
The Governor is appointed by the President of the
United States for a term of four years. At present the Gover-
nor is General (retired) Blanton Vvinship, of Macon, Georgia.
There are departments of justice, finance, interior, education,
agriculture, labor and health. The heads of these departments
constitute the governor's council. The attorney-general and
commissioner of education ai'e appointed by the President.
The heads of the other departments by the governor, with the
advice and consent of tlie senate of Puerto Rico. The juegis-
lature is composed of a Senate of lii members, and a House of
Representatives of 39, and these are elected for four years
by direct vote of the people. The Justices of the Supreme
Court are appointed by the President of the United States,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The legis-
lature elects a Resident Commissioner to Vvashington, with a
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voice but no vote in the House of Representatives, for a
terra of four years. Santiago Iglesia honors this position
at present. The island makes its own tax lav/s ana retains
all local revenue which in territories goes to the Federal
Goverment.
PQPUK\T10N
Puerto Kico's population is essentially rural. According
to the census of 1930, the population of the Island was
1,643,913 persons, or an average of 449.5 people to the
square mile. The estimated population of July 1, 1931, was
1,574,578 or a density of 458.4 per square mile, and of
July 1, 1932, 1,599,142 persons, or a density of 465.5 per
square mile. The estimated population of duly 1, 1933, -was
1,623,814 persons or a density of 472.7 per square mile.i,7)
The roads in Puerto Kico present a cheerful and lively
aspect in spite of the poverty. Driving across the island,
"jibaros" are seen continually on the highways. It is like
a parade of people going to and from work. Seldom is it
possible to enjoy a view of nature without a dot, a cabin
of a native, being seen on the slopes of the mountain ricges
marked by trails. Some of these cabins are in the most unima-
ginable places. It seems impossible that tiie dwellers could
ever get there. The construction of the laborer's cabin is
very poor. The commonest type uses a wide variety of
(7) Thirty-third Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto
Rico, 1.333, PP. S-7.

8-
material, wood, bark of royal palm, galvanized iron, zinc,
straw, oiled cardboard, and straightened oil cans. The
average cabin ±b no larger than from ten to twenty squai-e
feet, but will house a numerous family. The cabins are con-
structed about two feet from the ground level to allow rain
to run by, and to let the house dry.
RACIAL TRAITS
Racial lines are not strictly drawn in Puetto Rico.
Negroes of high intelligence often teach at schools, and
among students can be seen both whites and negroes learning
together. Among the higher classes race difference is given
more consideration. At their social gatherings negroes are
not allowed. The true "Jlbaro", or country man of Puerto
Rico, is a descendant of the poor whites who emigrated from
Europe, and who were driven by the negro slaves into the
interior of the island. The "Jibaro", or peasent, is of pure
Spanish extraction. (8) Kis very isolation was an important
factor in creating his distinctive qualities, which are,
however, changing greatly because of development of the
Island. He is superstitious, hard working, intelligent,
religious, simjle in his ways, and poor. Many of them go
barefooted. Their school education has been neglected. He
is the Puerto Rican who needs most urgently the assistance
of his Puerto Rican brothers, and that of the Americans.
(8) Diffie and Llffie, "A Broken Pledge" 7.
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PART II
AGRICULTURE
As Puerto Rico depends for most of her income upon
the soil, it is essential that har agricultural problems
never be overlooked. The island produces mainly sugar,
citrous fruits, coffee and tobacco. Even though Puerto
Rico is essentially agricultural, we find that over half
the total annual imports are food stuffs. There would be
nothing strange in this fact if countries had no tariff
protection, and production were based on that for v;hich
each country is best fitted. This, however, we know too
well is not the case. Nations are choking with tariff
entanglements. The depression which we have gone through,
and the monetary controversies have accentuatec the magni-
tude of the tariff dominion. If a nation depreciates its
currency, an equivalent increase in the tariff barrier is
immediately set by other nations.
The possible wisdom of free trade does not concern
Puerto Rico, which is by no means in a position to advocate
a "no tariff " plan. Neighboring virgin soil would launch
the island into sudden industralization which should only
be attained by carefully studied stages. The soil of Puerto
Rico is for a great part depleted by many centuries of
unscientific farming. A section of the southern part of the
island, recently brought under irrigation, is about its
only virgin soil.
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Cuba has always exerted much pressure on Puerto
Rican sugar production. Cubans produce sugar at substan-
tially lower cost. In 1.^33 the author learned from Cuban
students in America that because of the low price and
abundance of sugar, farmers were only cutting that v;hich
grew on old stems, and bags of sugar were given away with
every purchase in retail stores.
Brazil and Colombia are strong competitors in the
coffee market, especially xirazil, which may of itself,
supply the world. Luring 1933, Brazil ourned huge mountains
of its surplus output to counteract the ruinous prices.
Puerto Rico's production is negligible as compared to that
of Brazil, yet its quality is far superior to that of any
other country.
California and Florida are the chief competitors in
citrous fruits.
TKE SUGAR II^lLUSTRY
Sugar is the leading crop of Puerto Hico. Its importance
is embodied in the common phrase, "As sugar goes, goes
Puerto Rico". The tendency to dedicate the greatest portion
of the soil to this industry is ever increasing. In the
year 1899 sugar absorbed only about 15 per cent of the
cultivatec" area of the island. At present it is nearing
the -0 per cent mark. It is no wonder that Puerto Rico im-
ports such large amounts of food stuffs.
The industry is controlled by a limited number of
corporations among which we find the South Porto Rico Sugar
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Co., United Porto hico Sugar Co., Fajardo Sugar Co., and
Aguirre Sugar Co.; which in turn are controlled by absentee
owners
.
Most of the Island's su^^ar is delivered at American
refining ports during the first five or six months of the
year, i.e., after the Lousiana cane crop and the American
beet crop have been markated. Freight charges are higher
than those for Cuba. Puerto Hican producers are awakening
to the wisdom of doing their own refining and are beginning
to do so. The P.K. Sugar Ref. Co. on the southern part of
the Island is the first refinery to concentrate on this
industry in a large scale. The Gudnica Central, of the South
Porto Rico Sugar Company refines, but does not consider
this industry its mayor operation. Other refineries are
sure to come if the United States does not raise tariffs
on refined sugar to protect her mills. From an editorial in
the Boston Herald of March 4, 1934, the New England point
of view on the matter is seen. A quotation follows:
SUGAR AND NEV/ EN^GLAND
II In his message of Feb. 8, the President proposed
a quota system for the importation of sugar. Bills have
been introduced in both Senate and House to put it into
effect. The ^Imerican refiners ask for an amendment to
protect their industry.
n
"New England backs that amendment. Our refineries
employ several thousand' persons. In a single decade, the
Boston refineries have paid .'^46,000,000 in wages and supplies,
and consumed 700,000 tons of coal and 1,500,000 barrels of

oil, besides paying large taxes. Unless the limitations
sought by the amendment are allowed, the industry will be
confronted with the ugly dilemna of folding up or moving
out of the country."
"Until recently importations of refined si.igar were
negligible. Then the tariff schedules were so disloc^jted
that the refined rstes no longer provided adequate protection
for the domestic refineries. Cuba promptly went into the re-
fining business. The amount brought in from the island has
gone up 800 percent since 1925. Of the total imports of
626,000 long tons in 1933, more than two-thirds came from Cuba
the balance came from our insular possessions. Puerto Rico
is sending us 40 times, the Philippines 15 times, Hawaii three
times, as much refined sugar as in 1926."
'iJIot only the tariff, but the NRA enters into the
problem. Without affecting the costs of the business in
tropical countries, the NRA has Increased expenses in various
ways for the American refineries. For instance, the domestic
industry pays a processing; tax on the cotton bags used in
packing sugar, whereas Cuban refiners use the same bags and
pay no such fee. The difference is small in itself, but in an
industry where margins are so narrow, every fraction of a
cent is relatively of large importance. "
" What the domestic industry asks for is a chance to
live. The quota sy stein as such is not objected to. All that
is sought now is a division within the quotas which will so
divide them between raw and refined sugars as to protect the
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American refiners. The proposed amendment would divide
Cuban importations into 85 per cent raw, and 15 per cent
refined. It would limit importations from the Insular
possessions to the respective amounts sent here in 1933,
leaving the industry "as is" in Hawaii, the Philippines,
and Puerto Pdco."
"This is a reasonable demand."
The importance of this coming industry can not
be over-emphasized since the Island needs industrialization,
and to have it so spread that it will overcome the regular
seasonal unemployment from which the Island suffers. If
the industry is left "as is", in Puerto Rico, Congress is
forgetting to consider two important factors. First, were
in 1933 the refined sugar exports from Puerto Rico sufficient
to give a regular profit in the already fixed investments?
Secondly, is any consideration being given to the need of
further industrialization in Puerto Rico, or to the fact
that Puerto Ricans, as American citizens, should be per-
mitted to have free trade with the United States ? That
the NRA has not increased expenses in Puerto Rico is also
a mistake.
COLONOS
Those who grow cane and sell it to the centrales
are known as Colonos. The introduction of modern machinery
brought them into prominence. Concentration of the sugar
industry followed, and this converted many of the old mill
owners into Colonos, and permitted the peasants to become
sugar growers. Before the modern sugar factory came into
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existence, cane cultivation was a privilege of the rich.
Only those who had sufficient money to establish a "mus-
covado" mill, no matter how small, v;ere able to cultivate
sugar cane on their lands, Now> even farmers v/ho own only
four or five acres of land will cultivate one or two acres
of sugar cane, which they sell to the central factories on
the same basis as those who can cultivate on a much larger
scale. The railroad) which forms part of modern factory lay-
out? has made this possible. (9) The concentration of the in-
dustry v;as gradual. Ten years before the Island csme into
the possession of the United States, 446 sugar mills were re-
ported on the Island, of v/hich 286 v/ere moved by oxen and
160 by steam. (10) In 1900 sugaJlr began to be admitted free
of duty to the United States, and in 1910, ten years later,
the Island^ crop was substantially augmented. 146 estab-
lishments are taking care of the crop as follov/s: (11)
TYFLS OF SUGAR '.CILLS
modern Old
Item Central Steam Mill Ox Mill
Number of mills 4T l4~ ^
Total tons made 335,750 8,937 2,099
Average ton per mill 8,189 638 23
Percentage exported 96.4 76.6
Percentage consumed in 3.6 23.4 100.0
Porto Rico
In 1930, 42 Centrales ground the entire crop. (12 )
(9) Bird, Jorge, "The Economic Factors of the Central Sugar
Mill", The Book of Porto Rico. PP. 541-43.
(10) Carroll, Report on the Island of Porto Rico. I. 116,'
(11) Memorial de la Asociacion da Productores Agricolas
de Puerto Rico.
(12) Bailey vV. and J. W. Diffie, "A Broken Pledge". P. 46.
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The 41 Centrales do twelve times the amount of work that
took more than four hundred mills to accomplish before the
American occupation. The Colono either sells his cane out-
right to the central for a specified amount of sugar for
every one hundred pounds delivered, or receives a determined
amount in proportion to the sucrose content of the delivery.
Both of these methods have their difficulties. The first
encourages the Colono to grow those varieties which are
heavier, but not as rich in sucrose content. The other method
leaves the matter of determining the sucrose content to the
Central. Without the proper regulation both are uneconomical.
Where the Colono is to receive a specified amount of sugar
per one hundred pounds delivered, the central will not get
a sufficient sucrose content to warrant economy. To unders-
tand the other alternative, it is wise to study the methods
of determining the sucrose contents used by the centrales.
Centrales have their own chemists who make the tests.
To check up on their reports, the Insular Experimental Station,
in May 1930, carried out some experiments. In twenty-one
cases at the central Lefensa, and in nine cases at the cen-
tral Santa Juana, the test made ahowed a sucrose content
ranging from 15.94 to 22.26, whereas the highest sucrose cont-
ent showed by any mill for May, was 16.81, the average content
shown being between 14 and 16. Brix tests were also made and
ranged from 19.2 to 24.(13) The wide difference between reports
led the government to take action/ If theynwere to pay atten-
(13) Ibid. P. 67
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tion to the demands of the Colonos, the action would not be
adequate, nor if they followed the demands of the Centrales.
It would be beqt to decide on an accurate analysis, as the
Brix test, and have government regulation over these tests.
To add to the accuracy of the reports, it is also wise to
have the tests made frequently, and to take the samples from
the juice continually or at least intermittently, while the
cane is being ground. T^e Golono should receive 65 per cent
of the average content. This would create an incentive to
raise a high quality of cane and encourage better care and
delivery to the crushers.
THE CSLITRALES
That nearly half of the sugar manufactured in Puerto
Rico is produced by four large Centrales is very signifiaant.
This concentration would be opposed if the Foraker Act were
enforces. (14) Its 500-acre clause was meant to limit the
size of the coi'p orations, but it has never been enforced.
Under the present relations existing between the sugar inter-
ests and the government, the enforcement is politically irn-
possible. Candidates presented by the sugar interests are
given more importance than even those presented by the majority
parties. Even though this unfair attitude should be corrected,
I do not believe the enforcement of the Act would be economical.
Concentration of the industry allows for the better control and
(14) Register of Puerto Rico, 1925, P. 219.
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economy. The distribution of the crop between early and late
planting is hard to regulate even for the mills that grow
their own cane, and if the distribution of land were enforced
it would be almost ir.possible. Regulation tends to solve sea-
sonal unemployment and allows grinding the cane at the date which
will yield the maximum remuneration. Delivery can be controlled;
marketing is more efficient; concentration of capital for in-
ve stmtnt in more efficient machinery which is extremely ex-
pensive is necessary; irrigation and drainage systems can
only be financed by highly capitalized organizations; re-
search is made more effective: ^^nd unit cost is lowered.
Enumeration of favcrable factors would be lengthy. The mis-
take of many Puerto Ricans lies in blaming tliis concentra-
tion for the ailments of the industry. The fault is not there,
but in the stock ownership of these corporations. Co-opera-
tive mills have been proposed as a solution. To show the
folly of their contentions, it is worth indicating that co-
operative mills have been tried in many countries, including
Hawaii, and have succeeded only where they are owned and con-
trol ^.ed by a few big growers whose crops are vii'tually "ad-
mini stration " cane. (15)
The South Porto Rico Sugar Company (16) was in-
corporated under the laws of New Jersey, November 16, 1900,
to manufacture raw and refined sugar, molasses, end other
(15) Clark end Associates, Porto Rico and its Problems. F. 628.
(16) Moody's Industrial 1933, PP. 1107-1108.

18-
products of sugar cane and sin'.lle.r commodities; to enga^
in agriculture, and to plant, cultivate and grove sugar cane
and othier products, and to purchase and acquire obligations
and shares of the stock of other corporations. The Company
owns all the stock of the Central Romana, Inc., a Gon-^.ecti cut
corporation operating and owning about 75,000 acv'^.s In the
province of Seybo in S^nto Domingo, and a raw sugar factory
with a capacity of 600,000 bags. It also owns all the stock
of the South Porto Rico Sugar Gonpany of Puerto Rico, operat-
ing the Guanica Central sugar factory at Guanica, Puerto Rico,
which has an annual capacity of 700,000 bags. It owns 350
acres of land, railroads and other equipment. It also ovms
the entire stock (|l, 000, 000) of the South Porto Rico Sugar
Company Trading Corporation, incorporated in July, 1925, New
York, and the Dominican Stear.ship Company* In 1926, it ac-
quired the entire capital stock of Yngenio Santa Fe, C, por
A., a Dominican corporaticn which owns Central Santa Fe.
The latter company owns about 75,000 acres of land of which
20,000 acres are cultivated for cane.
Central Aguirre Associates (17) was organized in
Massachusetts August 1, 1928, as a voluntary association,
and primarily s s a holding company for shares of the Central
Aguiri-e Sugar Company. The con^pany controls Central Machete
Company, owns Central Santa Isabel Sugpr Company, grinds the
sugar cane produced by Luce and Company, S. en C., and owns
(17) Moody's Industrial, 1933. P. 287
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all the capital stock of the Ponce and Guayama Railroad
Company, operating 45 miles of railroad. The comVined
assets total over 14 million dollars.
The Fajardo Sugar Company of Forto Rico (16) v/as
incorporated in February 1919, in Puerto Rico as successor
to the Fajardo Sugar Company, manufacturers of sugar and
molasses. The Company has under cultivr.tion about 27,000
acres of sugar land, situated in the northeast portion of
Puerto Rico, at Fajardo, of v/hich about 15,000 acres are
ovmed outright, and about 12,000 acres controlled under
leave or contract for long terms. The Fajardo mill has a
daily capacity exceeding 55,000 short tons of rav/ sugar. On
October 6, 1925, it purchased the 22,500 outstanding capital
shares at $90 per share of Loiza Sugar Company, with its
Central Canocanas and cane lands adjacent to Fajardo Sugar
Company's holdings, capable of producing over 24,000 tons of
sugar per annum, making a combined capacity of over 80,0(0
tons for two mills now operated by the company. It controls
Fajardo Sugar Growers' Association, ovming real estate, etc.,
and Fajardo Development Company, ovming about 80 miles of
railroad, telephone systems, etc..
The other organization of importance dealing in
sugar in Puerto Rico is the United Porto Rican Sugar Com-
pany, but it is now for sale by the District Court of the
United States for the District of Puerto Rico. (19)
(18) Ibid. PP. 2110-2111.
(19) El Imparcial, Dec. 27, 1933. PP. 14, 15, 16, 17.
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ABSENTEE OVmKRSHIP
Absentee Sugar Companies control the largest pro-
ducing Centrales of the Island, holdinr; Companies that have
been incorporated for this purpose. In this manner- a large
portion of the profits from the sugor crops leaves the Is-
land to be spent in the United States or other countries.
The three large Centrales already mentioned are American,
Central Victoria, Incorporated, (20; operating
a mill at Carolina, Puerto nico, is a Spanish and Puerto
Kican Company.
Central Vanina, Incorporated, 1 21 J near d±o
Piedras, is Spanish owned by residents and absentees.
Central Coloso, Incorporated is also a Spanish
company.
To prove to what extent absentee ovmership con-
trols the Island I will quote Diffie and Diffie, "A Broken
Pledge". It has already been shown that the holdings of
the American sugar companies are one-fifth of the assessed
wealth of the Island. Vvhen it is considered further that
sugar represents about 67 per cent of the agricultural
wealth, and that the absentee companies produced 59 per cent
of the sugar, it is at once evident that they control in
sugar alone 40 per cent of the agricultural wealth'.
The number of Puerto Kicans who have lost their
lands to these coroorations is enormous. Many a complaint
(20) Diffie & Diffie, "A Broken Pledge" P. 50.
(21) Ibid.
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has the author heard from friends whose parents formerly
ov/ned extensive lands. They all explain how the bad wolf
realized their lands ..ould be a worthy additicn to the assets
of the Central, and how by unfair means Centrales finally had
succeeded in taking the lend away from' them. Much truth is to
be found in some of the cases where the large corporations v;ould
force loans on the people, and b. many other m.anlpulatlon3 at
the end gain possession of the desired land. Many however,
having preferred tc ssll than to labor, and improve the value
of their lands, and later would regret when by another's indus-
try the farm had tripled in value. Now that the United Porto
Rico Sugar Co. is in receivership, it is said that banks are
doing the same to them., as they did to the lone farm owners.
LABOR STRIKES
It is often said that strikes are the first signs
of a return to prosperity. If this is the case, Puerto Rico
is headed straight for many years of abundance and riches.
Numberous have been the strike wages in the Island during
December 1933 and January and February 1934.
On December 13, 1933, (22) 8,000 v/orkers of Central
Coloso went on a strike. The workers demanded higher wages,
specifying a salary of $2.50 for a day of six hours work.
They probably ^r'-ed for such high salary hoping that by
bargaining they could come out with a good average. Central
Coloso, like many other Centrales has a store for the con-
venience of the laborers in which credit is extended.
(22) Ibid.
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Their first move was to cloae the store and discontinue 1
credit. As a result of this first strike, many more have
followed. The workers at Central Guanica, (23) of the South
Porto Rico Sugar Goinp?rny also went on a strike. The Central
followed the precedent set by Central Coloso in clos'ng the
norker * s store and bringing men from outside to break the strike.
The losses incurred by the Company were high due to the loss of
sugar brought fror Santo Domingo, The steamer "Mary" was for
some time waiting to have the cane unloaded it had brought from
the Dominican Republic to be ground in Puerto Rico. Finally
she W8S ordered to leave port and dump the load overboard in
high se&s. The Insular Government lost $5,000 daily because
no sugar, was being imported.
The Guanica and Ensenada merchants cooperated with
the strikers since they claimed it was humanly impossible for
*a person to live on 60szf a day for twelve hours ^ork. (24)
Comparing wages to those paid to workers in Cuba, Puerto Rico
does not seem to be badly off. Quoting frorri the Ne'^' York Times
of September 24, 1933, in reference to a similar strike by
sugar plantation workers, "The workers' demands include a
minimum wage of 80 cents a dpy, eight-hour day, recognition of
the union, collective bargaining, half pay for unemployment,
free food and housing, free mediciae, and free autom.oblles
to the hospital". "OfficiBls' reports show the wages now --re
25 to 40 cents daily and the laborers are working over eight hours.
(23) La Preaaa, Decer,ber-ia, 1933.
(24) Ibid, ffanuary 8, 1934
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The fact that in China, a v/orker may labor for
ten cents all day does not mean a worker in the Jnitei
States should work for ten cents or even one dollar. The
fact that Cuba pa^/s lov; v/ages does not make unit cost lower
necessarily. Higher salaries may be paid which will en-
courage greater productivity tending to reduce cost per
unit. Efficient machinery, mass production, better control,
all will give the Puerto Kican laborer a better v;age and at
the same time better dividends to the stock owners. A
higher salary is surely needed by the workers in the sugar
industry. The large number of dependents on the average
worker, and the seasonal unemployment tie goea through are
strong arguments in his favor.
SUCtAk PkODUCTIOim
Indications are that this year the sugar crop is
going to be a very good one. Production has been increas-
ing tremendously since the year 1900, and reached its highest
peak in 1932. The following year, 1933, there v/as a drop of
176,095 tons. .t.s to value of exportation, 1932 is far from
the highest figure in the records of Puerto Kico. In 1920,
with a crop one half that of 1932, the value of the crop
was tv/ice that of 1932, The following exhibit taken from the
Thirty-third Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico
gives data from 1901 to 1935.
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SUGAR EXPORTS FROM 1901 TO JUNE 30, 1933
Production Exportation Value
Year (Tons of (Tons of of
2,000 Lbs.) 2,000 Lbs.) Exportation
1901 103,162 68, 909 4^4,715,611
1902 100,676 91,912 5,890,302
1903 139,096 113,108 7,470,122
1904 161,088 129,647 8,690,814
1906 214,480 135,663 11,926,804
1906 206,864 205,277 14,184,667
1907 230,095 204,079 14,770,680
1908 277,093 234,607 18,690,504
1909 346,786 244,267 18,432,446
1910 349,840 284,552 23,545,922
1911 371,070 322,919 24,479,346
1912 398,004 367,145 31,544,063
1913 351,666 382,700 26,619,158
1914 346,490 320,333 20,240,333
1915 345,490 294,475 27,278,754
1916 483,589 424,955 45,809,445
1917 503,081 488,943 54,015,903
1918 453,793 336,788 41,362,229
1919 406,002 351,910 48,132,419
1920 485,077 419,388 98,923,750
1921 491,000 409,407 72,440,924
1922 406,000 469,889 40,820,333
1923 379,000 355,423 46,207,276
1924 447,000 372,041 47,838,687
1925 660,003 571,569 53,261,896
1926 603,187 678,811 48,223,258
1927 629,135 674,689 54,766,984
1928 748,677 605,620 64,579,020
1929... 586,760 471,269 35,224,056
1930 866,109 721,217 63,670,038
1931 783,163 806,826 54,367,401
1932 992,432 912,169 55,116,976
1933 816,337 822,423 50,780,422
# Information from the Customhouse.
Production 1901 to 1920, Association of Sugar
Producers
.
Production 1921 to 1933, Department of Agriculture
& Commerce.
*
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In respect to world sugar production, Puerto
Rico is one of .the smallest producers. Cuba formerly al-
most entirely supplied the United States previDua to the tariff.
COSTIGA-JOr;LS EIx^L
v/hat v/ill come out of the Cost iga- Jones proposal
presented to Congress recently to limit sugar production is
difficult to say, (25J This proposal classifies Puerto -.ico
as a foreign country, resident Commissioner to V;r. shington,
Santiago Iglesiav , protested vigorously before the Senate
Comrrittee • He pointed out that the proposal, in Section 3 A,
includes Puerto Kico and other possessions as foreign coun-
tries, which is not the case, and that the dependence of the
Island for its income on the sugar industry is so marked that
it means ruin. Santiago Iglesia' v/ishes to have Puerto Hico
included in Section 3 E of the proposal, with the American
producers.
The "Asociacion Azucarera Filipina ' , of the Philip-
pine Islands asked Governor General Frank Ivlurphy to veto the
legislative proposal meant to limit sugar production for
two years
.
It appears therefore that nobody wishes to limit
production. Should the present tariff on sugar be lowered,
then there v/ould be real reason for complaint. Limitation
of production is a sound decision if supply is exceeding
demand and prices are lov/. The difficulty of such limitation
is to decide on a limitation ratio that all producers will
(25) Ibid Jan. 7, 1934
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consider fair and will te willing to accept. I do not be-
lieve that a limitation of this nature is possible at present or
that v;ill be accepted by all producers.
bOAiiD TO COlITROL SlJGi^K PkODUCTION
Considering v^hat has been done to stabilize the
price of cornmodities in the Unites States, it v/ould not
surprise me, if a proposal for a Board to stabilize the
price of sugar was made. The idea has been on occasions con-
sidered by sugar producers that find in those agencies a
dumping ground. Vihat happened to the Federal Farm loard
should be enough to discourage at attempt of this nature.
In 1929 the Federal Farm Board set out to stabilize the
price of cotton by taking a domestic surplus off the market.
Cotton was then selling at 17 cents a pound. Three years
later it sold at 5 cents. V,hen similar operations were be-
gun by the same agency in the case of wheat, the average
price of all gradesof that commodity in six markets was ^)1.24,
In 1932 it vms 46 cents. The Government of Brazil borrowed
funds from foreign bankers to enable it to purchase coffee,
burn coffee, even destroy whole acres of coffee trees, in an
effort to maintain prices; coffee fell from 15.8 cents a
pound in 1929 to 8.1 cents in 1232. A syndicate of Japanese
firms undertook to withdraw raw silk from the market when
it was selling at S4.43 a pound in February, 1930. In June,
1932, the average price was ^pl.l9. Attempts to "peg" prices
or lift prices by these means require a monopoly of the

market which is difficult if not impossible to a ttain in
commodity products, and should not be fostered.
Pi:OFITS ILi SUGAR
Profits in Sugar are ample from the point of view of
the stock holder. "There have been, naturally, difficult
times, but one of the numerous good years was quite enough
to wipe out even the memory of the losses". i.26)
Referring to the South Porto i(ico Sugar Company,
Diffie and Diffie, "A Broken Pledge ", says, "this company
has paid over a period of 30 years a steady dividend of
eight per cent on preferred stock, and dividends on common
stock from 4 to 115 per cent".
The same authors referring to the Fajardo Sugar
Company continue thus, "Beginning in 1908 the company paid
dividends of 10 per cent; in 1909, 8 1/2 per cent; in 1910,
10 per cent; in 1911, 5 1/4 per cent; in 1912, 7 per cent, and
in 1913, 1 1/4 per cent". For the years 1914 and 1915 no di-
vidends v/ere paid, but later years surely repaid as the quo-
tation shov/s. "Beginning February 1, a regular dividend of
2 1/2 per cent was paid up to and including Ifiay 2, 1929. In
addition to this, 5 per cent extra was paid on August 1 and
September 1 to bring the yeari profit to 20 per cent. In
1920, an extra cash dividend of 30 per cent, and a stock
dividend of 70 per cent b'rought profits to 110 per cent for
the year".
Good dividends have been paid up to 1929, but since
then ncfeL^idends have been passed by the Fajardo Sugar Company .
{26) Ibid Feb. 25, 1934.
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TOBACCO
The Tobacco Industry, like the sugar industry, has
developed rapidly since 190(, . In the year 1699, according
tl^ the census, only 5,693 acres were under cultivation. In
1929, it had expanded to 29,403 acres. (27; In the year
1933 exports of tobacco leaf were $5,694,147; Tobacco scrap,
stems, etc., .,?709,468; Cigars, ;,>1 , 284 , 289 ; Cigarettes, .^43,035
and other tobacco products, ^1,815. (28J
The reduction in exports value for the last fev/
years has been marked. Tobacco production for 1928-29 v/as
29,057,020 pounds valued at ^16,814,454; in 1928-28, about
22,000,000 pounds were produced and the amount exported was
valued at i.:p20,777 ,937; and in 1S26-27, 50,000,000 pounds
with exports valued at i;;>24,860,072 • (29j Compar-fed to
1933, when exports v;ere less than five millions, the fall
in exports is staggering,
1VIA11K1.T CONDITIONS
The reason for this condition is evident upon
analysis of market demand and prices. Prices have fallen
notably. As it will be remembered, the American Government
asked manufacturers to purchase tobacco at higher than mar-
ket prices and save it, to help producers. This fall in
prices » and how it was to affect Puerto Kico is dealt with
by the Governor of the Island in his 1931 report to the
(27) Diffie & Diffie "A Broken Pledge" P. 62.
(28 J 29th Governors' Keport, 1929.
(29; Puerto Rico Trade, published by the iMational City
Branch of i\ew York, 1S34.
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President of the United States. (30) He points out that
the growers were unable to sell their product because of
the high quali.ty of the tobacco and the low prices offered.
Under auch conditions the cultivators would not get enough
to even pay for the labor involved. They withheld a part of
the crop from the market and while waiting for higher prices
refrained fi-om further planting to prevent glutting the market.
The author has often driven across the Island and
recalls how many years a-^o the tobacco districts gave the
appearance of snow covered fields. Mosquito nets are used
to cover the tobacco plants and protect them. The white
cloth creates an interesting and striking contrast against
the green of the vegetation. Two summers ago it was difficult
to find a planted field.
The following up-to-date exhibit will give a fairly
accurate picture of tobacco production in Puerto Rico. It will
be noticed that it does not agree in figures with others already
given and obtained from former Governors* Reports, but gives a
relation of production to price paid per pound of tobacco. That
indicates why tobacco production had to be reduced.
(30) 31st Annual -t^eport of Gov. of P. d, P. 2.

30-
STATISTICAL DATA 01^ TOBACCO, 1921-1955
Average
Price
Average per pound
Year Acreage Production Produttion paid to the
Planted per Cda. tobacco
growers
(Lbs, j ( Lbs
.
) {%)
40,000 25,000,000 625 .^.2195
55,000 i'. 22,500,000 642
.2476
% 41,500 % 26,000,000 626 .2970
% 40,000 % 25,000,000 625 .2050
X 34,023 X 25,000,000 676 .5107
X 58,000 X 56,000,000 620 .5915
192*7 • • • • • X 61,900 X 50,000,000 614 .2200
X 40,545 X 27,000,000 671 • 2500
X 59,075 X 28,000,000 669 .2500
X 45,512 X 52,500,000 755 .2800
X 50,000 % 37,500,000 745 .2000
X 10,079 & 5,500,000 & 545 .1400
'f\ 25,500 17,000,000 671 .1500
{%) Information from the Coiranission for the Protection of
Puerto Kican Tobacco.
Ix) Information from the Department of -agriculture and Commerce.
(^O Estimiate, Department of Agriculture and Commerce.
Estimate, Department of Agriculture and Commerce.
THE TOBACCO IvIAk.KST
V.'ith a depression and a shrinkage of incomes,
people stopped buying those products that were high priced and
those they could do without.^ali3:s of expensive brands of
cigars were drastically reduced. The cheaper products
served the purpose and it v/as what the people demanded.
It even became a matter of joke the saying, "tVhat
this country needs is a good five cent cigar". The phrase
is however the explanation for the fall of tobacco exports
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from Puerto Kico, The Island tobacco exports are made
J, nearly 100 per cent to the United States, and the
United States was out to give the public v/hat they v/ere
demanding, a good five cent cigar, Cremo and many others
went immediately into the field. In order to do this and
still maintain a reasonable margin of profit, the cigar
manufacturers needed cheap tobacco. The Puerto iiican pro-
ducer could not meet this demand. They had tobacco, but
one of high quality which '- called for higher prices.
The result was that Puerto xiico had to curtail the cul-
tivation of the fragant leaf,
POKTO 1;IC0-A:*:L:vICAI^ TOBACCO COMPANY
The Porto-hico-American Tobacco Compan:/ ov/ns
all the stock of the Porto :\ico-American Tobacco Com-
pany of Porto Kico, half the capital stock of the Porto
riican American Leaf Tobacco Company, and controls the
Congress Cigar Company, In this manner they own and have
leases on some of the best tobacco lands of the Island,
at Cayey and Cidra,
Absentee ovmership of land in this field is not
as great as in sugar, but factory ownership is about 85
per cent A^^erican. (3lj
Control over the industry has been noticed.
The tobacco planters disregarding to meet and market through
an Association, v/ere left much in the power of the Porto
Kico-American Tobacco Company, which paid the prices they
(31 ; Diffie and Diffie P. 150
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wanted. Conditions are changing; growers have realized
the wisdom of planting and marketing by agreements and
are turning towards associations. In this manner they
can obtain better prices.
KESEaKCH
The Government is giving assistance to the to-
bacco growers. Three and a half kilometers out of Caguas,
in what is known as Canaboncito, stands "Granja de Tabaco
del Gobierno de Puerto r:ico"« {Z>2) The purpose of this
experimental station is to cross and obtain good standard
varieties, and to obtain seeds, Ivir, P. K, Binker, a to-
bacco specialist well known in the United States is in
charge. From information he made public, vie learn that
there are 222 different varieties and crosses of tobacco
plant under study at the station. The intentions are to
obtain one or two varieties that will be of high quality
and render more returns. The Departamento de Agricultura
y Comercio del Gobierno Insular" has varieties they con-
sider standard, Virginia No. 9 and U, X. Ko. 1, These are
the best varieties at present obtainable. The station is
not only trying to improve on them, but also to inouce to-
bacco cultivators to adopt these varieties.
TliE FUTURE
Vv'ith a return to prosperity, tobacco will again
resume its importance in the Puerto nico trade. The Grov/ers
Association is necessary and the government should assist
(32 J Puerto nico Illustrads Dec. 1933.
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that growera in forming efficient cooperative organizations.
The s tand-Mrdization of varieties and cultivatitu of tVio ae
that will conform with the oresent demand is preeminent.
To remain in a field that h&s little demand has been a
mistake for Puerto Rico. Exhibit No. Ill shows the relation
of acreage planted to production in pounds. It will be
noticed that for over a period of thirteen years they have
moved in almost perfect coordination. Therefore it shows
no increase in yield. A correction of this continuous pro-
portion is what is needed and for this end it is that better
that varieties should be planted, varieties that increase yield
and find a market. Otherwise Puerto Rico will be pacing over
and over the same difficulties in the tobacco industry. The
staggering drop in production in the year 1931-1932 should be
a lesson not to be forgotten, tut one that will be useful for
future planning. The increase 1933 shows is encouraging, and
indicates further increases, but the proportion of yield to
acreage planted remains almost equal. Correct this constant
relation and m.ake it move to a more irofi table position.
COFFEE
The history of the coffee industry is indeed much
different from that of the sugar industry. ViHiereas sugar
hp.s developed rapidly from its unimportant position into
the chief source of income for the Island, coffee has fallen
from the heights it attained in former years to rock bottom.
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Nothing is more eloquent than a chart representing the
coffee exports for the Island. Exhibit No, JV shows
the Puerto Rico exports of coffee for sixty-three years.
Even in 1870 Puerto Kico exported about tv/enty million
pounds, while in 1933 the exports barely keep away from
the base line. Coffee is even being imported from the
United States after the continent purchases it from Bra-
zil, 'Vhat is wrong with the coffee industry? Surely
there is a market in the United States for Puerto i.ican
coffee. The least that Puerto Kico could do is to pro-
duce all that is consumed on the Island.
COFFEE AC.^.£i^GE KEDUCBD
Coffee v/as Puerto Kico's primary source of
wealth before the Island became a possession of the
United States. V/ith the tariff protection offered to the
products of the Island, sugar began to expand. At first
the acreage dedicated to coffee vms n-ot affected , iilhere
was other soil that could be added to the sugar acreage
without interfering v/ith that of coffee. Expansion how-
ever continued for the new industry^ and coffee finally
was forced to make way for the more profitable industry.
No doubt the length of time it requires to place a coffee
plantation on a profitable standing made the farmers
cautious in shifting to a new industry. Exhibit No. 7/
shows the rapid development started in 1920. Profits
were exorbitant; sugar corporations paid dividends as high
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as 115^ in the case of the South Porto Rico Sugar Com-
pany. (33). The sugar craze was on; the white gold of the
tropics was flowing freely. For that same year coffee
production began to decrease. (Notice chart on coffee
exports). Coffee profits were small, and in the case of
many growers there even were losses. The following quo-
tation indicates the conditions.
It is a feet generally understood that coffee
planting has had a precarious existence for several years.
Very few planters are truly owners of their property.
Many of them are perforce tenants at will working for
the ben afit of the creditors to whom their plantations
are m.ortgaged. But all have lost hope of securing re-
muneratige prices, and are abandoning their lands to the
hands of nature, merely performing the indispensable
labor of weeding, picking the best of the crrjp and mar-
keting It... The product per cuerda, including the best
lands, fluctuates in the neighborhood of two hundred-
weight, and at present Drices do not pay for the cost of
keeping up the plantation. (54)
Even though conditions did not favor the pro-
duction of coffee, many growers stayed in the fields.
Little did they realize what the future had ir store
for them.
(33) Diffie & Diffie "A Broken Pledge" P. 63
(34) Septimo Informe Anual del Negociado del Trabajo
dlrigida a la Asamblea Legislative de Puerto
Rico, 1920, PP 35-36

HURRICAIIE OF 1928
In. the year 1928, San Felipe (hurricanes are
named after the patron saint of the day the hurricane
comes J destroyed in wholesale fashion shade trees and
coffee plantations. In June 30, 1931, The Governor's re-
port places special emphasis on the damage done by the
hurricane in respect to coffee.
COFRLE CULTIVATION
Vvhy is it that coffee feels so intensively the
effects of a hurricane? Coffee plants need from four to six
years to pay for their cost of cultivation, and from
eight to ten years before the farmers get into the clear
as far as the money he has invested during early ^^ears is
concerned. Hecause it tekes that long before profits be-
gin to accrue, he fears the planting of coffee.
COFFEE MA.-{KET
The coffee market has been falling back on
Puerto Kico. Of all exports, the one that was hardly
bought fc)y the United States was coffee. The i'jnerican
public is educated to drink coffee of poorer quality,
Brazilian coffee which cannot compete in quality v;ith
that of Puerto Kico. Coffee exports of the Island were
mainly to Europe and Cuba. The follov/ing quotation
analyzes the exports and demonstrates thaE Puerto Kico
has no alternative, but to agree to the futility of
optimism for the present concerning the industry.
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In 1925-1926 we reported optimistically as to
the future of coffee on this Island, Within a few years
our exports of coffee fell to 14,837,436 pounds in 1922-1923.
The total value of our exports likewise increased from
^2,780,912 in 1922-1923 to $7,082,714 In 1925-1926. Con-
afi-dering these facts we had sufficient reason to be optimistic.
"The total coffee for the years was 18,961,009
pounds valued at ;|5,626,302. This represents a decline of
28 per cent in quantity, and 20.7 per 'ce lit in value for the
previous year. Germany took 25.35 per cent of cur coffee,
Cuba 24.86 per cent, Spain 20.24 per cent, Italy 11.59 per
cent. Low Countries 7.44 per cent, Prance 3.54 per cent, and
Switzerland 2.03 per cent. The coffee consumed in the United
States does not merit mention as it is extremely small.
Our exports of coffee to Cuba have declined appallingly (i.e.
from nearly 88 per cent of the Island's exports, on? 11,500,000
pounds in 1924-25 to less than 25 per cent of the Island's
exports or under 5,000,000 pounds in 1926-27.) Cuba was the
most important consumer of our coffee. She is laboring to
develop the cultivation of this crop in her province of
Oriente." (35)
(35) Infoi'i;,e del Goraisionade de Agriculture y Trabajo al
Trabajo al honarable Gobernador de Puerto Rico,
1926-27, PP. 21-22.
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HURRICANE OF 1952
The latest natural deatructive force felt In Puerto
Puerto Rico was the hurricane of 1932. To add to the many
hardships that the Island has been through, this terrific
hurricane came, that laid Wf? ste to millions of dollars worth
of property. The coffee crop again suffered the onslaught of
the high velocity of the wind. The little that had been
replanted wss destroyed. The high hopes that the growers had
for a good season were ruined.
IMPORTANCE OF COFFEE
To realize the impcirtance of coffee in determin-
ing the future of .the Island we must understand that
Puerto Rico has a v,'-st majority of the Island under cul-
tivation. For this purpose forests need to be eliminated
to make ground for the crops, but without forests Puerto
Rico would be a desert, and agriculture impossible. A
substitute is necessary for forests. Here lies the great
importance of coffee. Coffee is an agricultural product,
one that predicates a forest or its equivalent. (36) Coffee
la planted under trees that supply the necessary shadow for
its cultivation. With this combination the Island would
be in a position to maintain its agricultural scale.
COFFEE PL/^NTATION S^/iPLOYIAEI'IT
Moreover, there is another favorable factor to
coffee planting, employment. The plantations give labor to a
(36) An. Rep. of the Gov. of P. R. PP. 2-3. - 1931
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large number of workers, and the simplioity of the labor
makes it possible to employ men, women and children. It
may be criticized that the author mentions child labor,
but I desire to e xplain that Puerto nican country people
who v^ould supply the labor are extremely poor and must
make the most out of their incomes. VVhy not, therefore,
allow all the members of the family to contribute to
the family budget? Only very recently the consideration
of the Child Labor Problem cam;e up and the number of edu-
cators that opposed the restriction of it was considera-
ble. Dean Lord, of Boston Univer sitjr, was quoted by
Boston newspapers, giidng his opinion on the matter. He
pointed out that it was necessary to afford means by
which those of less financial resources could afford a
satisfactory education. The situation in Puerto Rico
makes it still m^ore essential to oermit child labor. For
the present let it stand that education needs further
encouragement on the Island. The matter will be dealt
with in detail later.
ti-:e future
The fact that coffee may solve the forest pre-
dicament, and that it affords adequate em^ployment are not
sufficient to encourage the industry to develop. There
must be profits as an incentive. Profits will determine
whether coffee will start on a recovery dirve or be for-
gotten in Puerto Rico. To decide on the future it is
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therefore essential to determine whether there may be
profits in the industry.
"V/ljile the area in coffee may be curtailed
rather than extended, yields per acre can probably be
doubled or even quadrupled by well tested improvem.ents
in plant.ation practice such as scientific seed selection,
fetter seed distribution, pruning, and fertilizing, all
of which sre now neglected. Intercropping of fruit with
coffee has been suggested :nd to some extent tried as a
means of increasing the income per acre in certain dis-
tricts, rut thus far the methods employed have not proven
entirely satisfactory." (37)
Clark considers the possibility of reducing the
coffee acreage, yet shows very clearly the possibilities
of the industry. Ke mentions that the scientific cul-
tivation of coffee had alv/ays been neglected in Puerto
Rico, and on this point the author is quite sure, for he
has seen many a plantation under extremely poor care.
That pruning, seed selection, better tree distribution
and fertilizing v/ill help is reasonable.
The encouragement the government is giving the
farmers is very significant. It has undertaken scienti-
fic experimenting under the conviction that coffee can
bring profits. The number of seedlings from beds dis-
tributed during the year 1931 ending June 30 carries
conviction. The following report o^: coffee seed beds
will help explain the situation.
Refer to Exhibit No. V (37) Clark & Ass. F.R. and its
Problems. P. 469.
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FRUITS
Citrous fruit cultivalion Is comparatively re-
cent. The road 'beti'/een Bayarnon and Comerio has on both
sides extensive plains dedicated to fruit growing.
Oranges, grapefruit, and pineapple comprise the -najor
portion of this industry. The farmers, v/ o are mostly
Americans, have proven the value of this land. "They
live in comfortatle dv/ellings, in many cases provided
v/ith all modern conveniences. They have proven the coun-
try a pleasant place to live in. The growers are mostly
Americans v/ho came to the Island years ago. They re-
present a progressive element in our agriculture.'' The
development of our fruit industry has been due in great
part to the fact that the farmers -ictually live on the
farms. Our native farmers in general present a marked con-
trast '.vith the continental fruit growers. Our native
farmer, as soon as the farm begins to produce a fair in-
come, has a decided tendency to move to the town., to en-
joy modern conveniences and pleasures of life." (sr)
Vihy the industry has not developed before may be
partly explained ^^y the lack of information of the "jibaro"
on the intricate details of grading, packing, marketing,
and taste requirements of the markets. But t-Uta hardly
explains v;hy educated Islanders have not entered the in-
dustry
.
(38) Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor Report, 1924-25.
P. 43.

42-
FRUIT EXPORTS
Exports to the United States in this industry
for the fiscal year 1932-1933 were in oranges, 13,548
"boxes valued at :^38,770; grapefruit, 266,42^. boxes valued
at s!^805,568; pineapples, 409,868 crates valued at ^1, 212, 658^
and other fresh fruits, v359. (39)
Canned grapefruits, pineapples, and grapefruit
juice are also exported, their value being over one-hun-
dred thousand dollars.
The fruit exports from 1921-1932 are:
THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1933 Page 572
FRUIT EXPORTS
Dollars
1920 2,782,725
1921 3,145,259
1922 2,857,086
1923 4,570,359
1924 3,807,567
1925 4,202,840
1926 6,009,090
1927 5,823,088
1928 6,347,000
1929 2,843,213
1930 7,671,525
1931 4,573,789
1932 7,101,617
FRUIT IliDUSTRY RISKS
This crop, like coffee, is exposed to hurri-
canes and other v/ind hazards. The last few years are cruel
testimony to the fact. One hurricane in 1928, and another
one in 1932 both played havoc on the Island. As a re-
sult, the industry has to cay heavy insurance premiums
(39) 33rd Annual Report of the Gov. of P . R. 1933
P. 106

43-
wbich are a burden In production costs. This condition,
however, is 'shared by all Caribbean neighbors and Florida.
Another difficulty is the nossibility of an
unfavorable market. It cannot be forced to chfaige, but
by means of refrigeration, marketing may be delayed until
conditions are more favorable. The fruit growers have
formed a very beneficial association in this respect. The
association helps to market the product and has storage
facilities for maintaining the fruit in condition until
time to ship it.
THE FUTURE
The fruit industry has not yet reached its peak
by far. The possibilities are promising, due to consider-
ation being given to research and further perfection of
varieties. Because of the fact that fruit exports may be
intercrop -^ed with coffee, these two industries present a
satisfactory relation to Puerto Rico and m.ay be closely
associated in the future with Puerto Rican development.
OTHER FRUIT INDUSTRIES
Among the other, fruits grown on the Island are
bananas, cocoanuts, caco beans, avocados and ginger roots.
Of all these fruits, cocoanuts are the most im.portant
as to value of exports, which in 1933 were $152,055. They
are shloped in tlie shell to reduce freight charges, and to
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take advantage of the cheaper labor on the Island. Coco-
nut trees grow near the coast .As a. result of the hurri-
cane of 1932,, losses in tre:;s v/ere heavy.
"Over a third of the coconut trees were des-
troyed ".nd it v/ill require seven years for replacement." (40)
VEGETABLES i-.m GRAIMS
Little consideration has fever been given to the
possibilities of vetetable growing on a sufficient scale
to te.ke care of home consumption and exports. Puerto Rico
has been importing vegetables and grains in large amounts.
In 1932-1933, even though imports were lower than in former
years, imports of rice alone were 243,r.32,ClG pounds,
valued at .-,p5,016,796 . (41) Dried beans are another '"one of the
largest items on the list of imports with 38,557,596
pounds for the same year, valued at ^pl, 175, 774. A great
portion of these imports could be produced in Fuerto Rico
without difficulty, especially by the small land ov/ners.
The governor of Fuerto Rico, in his annual re-
port for 1931, referring to the vegetable market possibi-
lities, emphasizes the tariff protestion afforded in this
market to Fuerto Rico. The United States imports
$12,000,000 of fresh vegetables annually. The governor
mentions that the goverm.ent has provided a packing house
in the Isabella Irrigation district to encourage and
assist in developing this market industry. For the time
the report was made^ things did look promising.
(40) The World Almanac, 1934, F. 572
(41) 33rd An. Rep. of the Gov. of F.R., 1933. P. 93
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In 1928-29, exports were 368,163 TDOunds , and for 1929-30,
they bed increased to 1,6'^8,458 pounds. However, 1932
saw a reduction in exports. The upward trend resumed in
the following fiscal year, exports to the United States
for 1932-33 reaching almost two million pounds.
It is significant that Puerto Rico exports
vegetables to foreign countries, exports for 1932-33
amounting to 792,511 pounds. If Puerto Rico exports this
amount to foreign countries there is no reason why those
to the United States cannot increase consider ably , be-
cause the market is nearer, tariff protection is afforded,
and there is better comnruni cation between the two countries.
By calculation, the average poxind value froir. the balance of
trade for 1932-33, that of the vegetable exports to the
United States is a fraction over two and a half cents
higher than for foreign exports. Profits are therefore
higher in ex-oorts to the United States, giving reason to
concentrate in the latter market.
That Puerto Rico imports vegetabjes and other
edibles may be explained by the ^reference of the people for
other than native products and because the hurricanes that
hit the Island force importation of food stuffs. Santo.
Domingo exports vananas to Puerto Rico in large amounts,
but these exports are more marked after a hurricane. Fol-
lowing one of these destructive storms, the fruit of the
plants thrown down has to be marketed as soon as possible.
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The excessive supply forces prices down, but soon the sup-
TDly is exhausted and 'Drices jump. Importation is encouraged
by these conditions, resultinp; in that the pe 'ple get used
to the importation and the farmer pays little attention to
replanting his farm.
The vegetable industry should be closely asso-
ciated with the social problems of the Island. All country
people and a high percentage of city people too, follov/ a
most improper diet. The fresh vegetable seldo^ forms a
part of the menu. A tropical Island like Puerto Rico should
advocate fresh vegetables for the table, at least more fre-
quently than used a present, the islanders claim that pre-
cisely because of the weather, heavier food is needed to
supply the energy lost because of the heat. Whether the
argument is reasonable or not, the fact remains that more
fresh begetables should be consumed on the Island, also the
market the United States affords should be further developed.
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Pi\i(T III
INDUSTRIES
It has already been mentioned that Puerto Rico
depends on agriculture for the largest part of her in-
come. The industries are hov/ever in the embryo stage.
COTTON MANUFACTURII'lG AND EMRROIDERIES
The United States found in Puerto Rico an Is-
land where labor is plentiful and wages lov/. It v;as
therefore cheaper for American manufacturers to send
material to Puerto Rico and have the labor done by the
natives. Little was it realized at the moment hov; pro-
fitable this was going to be or how rapidly the pr;\ctice
was going to expand. San Juan, Mayaguez, Ponce, Arecibo
and almost all towns have "talleres" doing work for con-
tinental corporations. These corporations send material
to Puerto Rico, lettis say toA.Rodiquez & Co. in Martin Pena.
T'^e cloth remains owned by the American corporation and
Mr. Rodriguez is responsible for it. He has a "taller", in
fact the largest and most efficient is San Juan, There he
hires women to do the v/ork. Piece rate is the usual method
of payment. Once the material has been turned into a
dress, an apron, a handkerchief or something else, it is
returned to the United States :'nd. he gets paid. Under
these conditions the Vusiness has so rapidly developed
that Mr. Rodriguez is unable to tahe care of fll the orders
he receives. To expand the "taller" he requires additional
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capital and more fixed investments v;Mch are not v/ar-
ranted. Ke therefore commissions representatives to do
the work for him. In small towns, an enterprising person
is approached and given work to do. These tovm people's
"business also grov;s in proportion so that soon he has
machinery and a large number of workers under hiiM. In
this fashion the embroidery business has expended and
at present supplies thousands v/ith la"^ or.
It v;as customar:/ to work both in silk and. cotton
formerly, now cotton is more popular. The reason for the
change is that silk is more expensive^ and. a mistake on
the part of the laborer is costly. Silk soils and spots
very easily, and if washed to clean it, some of the luster
is lost. The sender v;ill not accept the material and. re-
quests payment. The silk work that is still done is taken
care of by San Juan factories, v/here skilled labor is more
plentiful and transportation to the interior tov/ns is
saved. The added transportation '"one by trucks exposes
the material to soiling. The tovm agents do not desire
to work in silk anyway, for under contract they are res-
ponsible for the material. Cotton may be v/ashed if it
should, be soiled.
Exports in cotton manufactures and embroideries
have been: (The value of the m.aterial is included in the
figures, this value boosting the balance of trade both
for imports and exports equally).
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1932 ^9,499,415 (42)
1931 12,443,299 ) (43)
1930 13,117,040 )
Hat$ (straw), dresses, men's clothing, etc.
fpcCtories are open in the larger cities of the Island.
Miranda Hnos., in Santurce has an established reputation
for its shirts.
Department Stores and men's clothing stores
opened factories to supply some of their merchandise,
especially that of summer v/ear . G-c«i zalez Padin Co. had a
factory manufacturing the palm beach suits they sold, but
discontinued it. The Cabrer Store manufactures the strav;
hats they sell. Although this has been a good start, fur-
ther industralization is needed.
TH£ FUTURE
The future of laboring on continental material
depend on low wages, and efficiency. As soon as labor
costs rise in Puerto Rico, or they lower sufficiently in
the United States, fannufacturers on the continent will
stop sending material and look for a new country. The NRA*
by forcing raises in salaries in the United States^helps
,
but similar measures are being made in Puerto Rico. The
efficiency of the Puerto Rican laborer in this type of
work is well known, and is a factor that widens the margin
between salaries that determines a shift to a new place.
(42) The Y^'orld Almanac, 1934, P. 568.
(43) Ibid , 1933, P. 572.

50-
As long, therefore, as wages increase or deci*ease pro-
portionally on both sides and at the same time, or in-
creases more ranidly in America, the industry will bene-
fit. The 31 hour week with higher salaries now advo-
cated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt will naturally
favor Puerto Rico.
PUERTO RICO COTTON
There is another rich possibility for Puerto
Rico. The Island grows cotton whioh commands high prices.
The cikltivation however is done on a small scale and has been
hindered by excessive fluctuation of prices and the "pink
boll worm". Should the effort be made, a production of
20,000 to 30,000 bales could be raised '.i/ithout serious
com.petltion with other crops.
A COTTON LULL
The establishing of a local mill would there-
fore find an assured and adequate supply of raw material.
A mill of this nature would not depend on high salaries
for American labor, and it would add to the industriali-
zation of the Island. In Puerto Rico itself there is a
market the tariff protection oresents in the United States.
Other fiber plants like sisal can be grown in-
restricted areas. There are further possibilities towards
development of industries in Puerto Rico.
RESEARCH NEEDED
No commercial attempts have ever been made in
many of the economic resources of the Island. Vanilla,
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cacao and the mulberry tree deserve consideration. The
goverament should establish a fund for their study and
encour ageiEent if proven satisfactory commercially. They
will possibly never be the primary source of income, but
will be important in stabilizing the cash income of the
Island, and will be a step towards diversification '.vhich
is so gi'eatly needed.
Reeling of silk could also be industrially de-
veloped. Clay molding is almost certain to prove a success
if tried on a large scale. It has nrovan satisfactory on
a small scale, and one finds in Puerto Rico a plentiful
supply of the best clay.
TH3 GASOLINE PROBLEIu
Puerto Rico at almost all times has oaid ex-
tremely high prices for gasoline. The very Isrge number
of -oassenger cars and the large proportion of freight
transportation done by trucks make gasoline a commodity
which s hould not be monopolized. The cost should not be
unreasonable. Commercial transportation is done to a
great extent by gasoline propelled vehicles. In San Juan,
ujify ' and vicinity busses f the White Star Line and the
trolley cars of the Porto Rico Railway Light and Power
Gomp ny are in com.petition for the bulk of passenger trans-
portation, the first holding the upper hand. The price
of gasoline determines greatly the ability of this conpany
to m-aintain a five cent fai-e so important to tl e public. It
is because of the importance of gasoline to the public that

the retail price should hz. regulated and not be allowed
to f all victim of monopoly. It is true that a tax of
seven cents is placed, on each gallon sold and this tax
necessitates an increase in price, but even this high t-x
does not warrant the prices now in force. This t^x is
known as the Gasoline Tax, by Act 40 of A. ril 24, IS3I.
Four corporations handle the gasoline in Puerto
Rico, Shell Oil Co., Texas Oil Co., '-.est India Oil Co.,
and Pyramid. Shell and Pyramid are Danish and English, while
Vi/est India and Texas are American. All are well organized
and have the backing of home corporations a^ le to weather
them through hard times.
It is improper to even consider that these cor-
porations may have made a secret agreement, but gasoline
prices were gradually increase-' without much show of
competition or need to increase prices, until during the
last months of 1933 the price was up to 31 cents a gal-
lon. That this was an exorbitant and unreasonable price
was the public belief. They had patiently stood formerly
for higher prices that they considered fair to pny, but
this was rather too much. A general protest w^'S made /"Ut
no reduction followed. The public then decided on boycott. On
December 28, 1933, all motor traffic was stopped. The
trolley cars were forced to discontinue service, even
the passenger boats between San Juan and Catano, a small
toTTO across the bay from the capital were stopped, since these
treats use gasoline. San Juan v/as silent; many stores closed
and those vrhich did not had as customers onlv those who
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as a joke would bicycle, roller skate or horseback
ride into town. T^e city had no milk, no delivery of
groceries, nothing. It was, however, a peaceful boycott.
Mr. Benjamin Horton, provisional governor of
Puerto Rico at the time, since Mr. Robert H. Gore, the
actual governor v^-^s on the continent, tr'ed his best to
end the boycott. Hon. Ira K. Wells, Judge of the Federal
District Court ^f Puerto Rico advised a nrice of 20 cents.
An investigation was made. (Ira K, V/ells is at present
retired). Should this price be found to result in losses
to the oil companies, they would be paid to cover losses.
Mr. Prudencio Rivera kartinez. Secretary of Labor, proposed
to the Insular Legislature that a fund be fixed for pay-
ment of possible losses so as to present further losses
and complications, since all the Island had already joined
in the boycott. Provisional Governor Benjamin J. Horton
fixed an arbitrary price of 20 cents and ordered an in-
vestigation on December 31, 1933. The commission was to have
two m.embers appointed by the Executive Council of Puerto
Rico and two representatives of the oil companies. The
books of the corporations are open for inspection. The
provisional price was accepted by both sides until further
investigation.
Looking back to former days of the gasoline
history, it is noticed that the Borinquen Refining Company
was started under similar conditions. It promised to be-

come a profitable and beneficial enterprise. The govern-
ment had granted them ten years of tax exemptlor^ and the
public, tire^' of high prices, v/as desirous of assisting.
The Borinquen Refining Company was organized to import
crude oil, refine it*and retail the ultimate product,
As it happened, the corporation failed.
There v;ere several reasons for its failure. The
corporation never did any refining, neither did they
have the machinery for the cracking of oil into gaso-
line. The gasoline they imported for retailing dis-
solved tar from the sides of the boats in which it was .l^rought,
giving the gasoline a dirty brown color. The foreign
oil companies based their attack on the quality of the
product even though no direct advertising v;as ever done
in that direction. The gasoline is of good quality,
but the executives^ apparently lacking in advertising "ability
disregarded to launch an aggressive campaign to establish
the qualities of the product and gain the confidence of
the public. It can be seen that their first mistake
was in not having been prepared to do actual refining.
If it vi^as necessary to sell imported gas while making
ready for refining, they should have let the public know
they were importing high quality gasoline until ready to
serve them with a native manufactured product. Again
they made a mistake in choosing the site for the refining
and storage. They decided on a hillside by the road
between Santurce o.nd. Bayamon, a site that made necessary
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large capital investmenta to orepare navigable channels
for incoming ooats witti tine crude oil. The site was
distant from San Juan, and labor was inadequate.
Agsisted by the strong financial bacl-dng of the
home corporations, the foreign companies were able to
meet competition and could afford to lose money. .vhen
the Borinquen Refining Company finally ran out of funds
and failed, the foreign companies raised prices, and they
no doubt made up shortly for what had been lost during theses
days of severe competition.
Wit}i the present investigation ©oing on, various
proposals have been made to solve the gasoline problem.
One is the revival of the Borinquen Refining Company by
having the government undertake it. With the price now
at 23 1/2 cents, the government realizes it would be a
good business to refine gasoline. The revival seems
commendable, but not to be undertaken by the govern-
ment. Private citizens should be encouraged to un-
dertake the business. In the hands of the government
it v;ould turn out to be just another place where poli-
ticians could get a job. Politicians are seldom good
economists anyway. Such an enterprise would not only
bring better competition, which is the true regulating
force of the price of gasoline, but would also add an-
other industry to Puerto Rico which needs it to give em-
ployment to its numerous citizens and it would be a wonderful

56-
step towards solvinf^ the seasons . unemployment from which
Puerto Rico suffers.
Gov. General Blanton Winship is in s-'rmpnthy
with the gasoline consumers and it is to be hoped a
satisfactory solution will cone out of this predicament.
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PART IV
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS AND INSTITUTIONS IN PUEhTQ HICQ
Trade
The visible balance of trade for Puerto Rico has
been a favorable one for al] occasions except three,
since 1902. Exhibit No . /tY shows the exports and imports
for Puerto Rico from 1925 to June 30, 1933. (41) The
exports are greatest during the first months of the yeair,
as a result of the sugar exports which constitute the
most important item. Imports are greatest for the last
months, this being explained by imports for Christmas
time and the annual carnival (similar to Ithe Mardi Grp. s in
New Orleans)
.
Trade with the United States
To make more comprehensible the status of Puerto Rico
in trading with the United States, Exhibits No. and
No . // are included. In the year 1931, Puerto Rico
purchased more than any other Latin American Republic.
Purchases were over $60,000,000. In 1932, Puerto Rico
still holds the first position. Its purchases in dollars
have fallen to less than fifty millions, but Mexico, the
second in rank, is far behind. How many realizev this fact
is difficult to say, but it is certain that not many
Americans are conscious of the importance of Puerto Rico
as a customer for their goods.
(44) 33rd Annual ileport of the Gov. of P..i., 1033,Lx. 53
.Oli
.Blzmis) iBV.'
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In reference to world trade of the United States
i
again Puerto Rico shows a high classification. It is
eighth as an importer and seventh as an exporter to the
United States.
PUERTO RICO'S PLACE IN THE EXTERIOR
TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES
Shipments from the United States
Countries 1931 1932
1. United Kingdom $446,974,000 4^288,326,000
2. Canada 296,355,000 241,351,000
3. Japan 155,715,000 134,545,000
4. Germany 166,050,000 133,417,000
6. France 121,820,000 111,561,000
6. China. 97,923,000 56,171,000
7. Italy 54,815,000 49,135,000
8. Puerto Rico 60,637,000 48,780,141
9. Netherlands 65,590,000 45,264,000
10. Sov. Russia 103,486,000 12,466,000
Shipments to the United States
Countries 1931 1932
1. Canada $266,268,000 $174,101,000
2. Japan 206,349,000 134,011,000
3. Brazil 110,212,000 82,139,000
4. Philippine Islands. 87,133,000 80,877,000
5. United Kingdom 135,452,000 74,631,000
6. Germany 127,039,000 73,572,000
7. Puerto Rico 87,912,000 73,388,000
8. Colombia 75,482,000 60,846,000
9. Cuba 90,059,000 68,330,000
10. British Malaya.... 82,073,000 34,806,000
The above table leaves no doubt sa to the importance
of Puerto Rico in trade with The United States. It was
copied from the governor's report for 1933. to the
United States.
.1
• • • •
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The high rank may be traced to the tariff protection
given the Island. To show the effectiveness of the tariff^
the following table is copied from the same source
i
TRADE BETWEEN PUERTO RICO, THE UNITEL STATES
AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Merchandise F. Y. 1932-33
From United States $48,886,644
To United States 73,388,298
From foreign countries 5,859,067
To foreign countries 2,018,157
Total i}il30, 152,166
Nature of Trade
The nature of the trade shows a very significant
fact. The balaince of trade as reported for 1933 by the
governor of Puerto Rico, takes eleven and one half pages
to list the nature of the articles purchased by Puerto
Rico from the United States. The list of those ejcported
to the United States is little more than one page. Vie may
therefore say that Puerto Rico is highly specialized and
as a result is in need to import a great variety of items.
A similar situation is found with exports to foreign
countries
•
The condition has already been noticed in vegetables.
The dependence on foreign countries has already placed
the Island in predicaments. During the World War there
was a shortage of vegetables that the Island was forced
9fla/OffB 9''; r:''';..t '^r^
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to meet.
The Invisible Balance of Trade.
The true balance of trade that Puerto Rico has had
every year is not known by the public. Only those who
make extensive investigations and calculations get to the
truth. The balance of trade that is presented to the
people contains the visible items, the invisible remain
a mystery. The difficulty of obtaining data of this
nature makes it hard to publish a true balance. Guesses
are necessary, and these may be far from accurate.
Clark and Associates made extensive studies of the
trade conditions , and included in their book, "Porto Kico
and its Problems", page 414, an account of the invisible
items and its effects on the Puerto Rican trade. The
study was made for 1928, when a visible favorable balance
of trade was annnounced# Their detailed report is here
given.
"INTERNATIONAL" INCOME ACCOUNT, YEAR ENUING
JUNE 30,1928
(Figures are given in 1000 's)
OPERATIONS RESULTING IN NET INCOIwE TO PORTO RICO:
Commodity trade:
Recorded exports of commodities $153,535
Sales of bunker coal and oil... 827
Ship chandlery and ship repairs 50
$104,412
Less:
Recorded imports of commodities 92,342
Contraband imports of liquor... 1,000 93,342
$11,070
Gifts and contributions:
For educational purposes 95
Foreign missions and churches 320
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Health 70
Scientific research 21
606
Federal expenditures in Porto Rico 2,712
Advertising. 400
Net total from operations listed above 1^14,688
OPERATIONS RESULTING IN NET OUTGO FROM PORTO RICO:
Freight payments and marine insursince on imports.. ^5yd80
Commissions
:
Payments 4,290
Less receipts 100 4,190
Remittances:
Sent to Porto Ricans living outside the
Island 1,232
Less amounts received from Porto Ricans
living abroad and in the U. S 930
302
Tourist trade:
Outgo by Porto Ricans 582
Less ineome from outsiders 472 110
Insurance transactions (exclusive of marine) 1,980
Motion pictures royalties 160
Cable and radio charges . . • • • 247
Lottery tickets....... 1,000
Interest, dividends, and rents
paid to:
Continental and foreign inves-
tors by Porto Ricaji goverment.. if2,072
Federal Land Bank and Inter-
mediate Credit Bank 676
Continental and foreign inves-
tors by private persons and
corporations 9,400
12,148
Less amounts received by:
Insular goverment on exter-
nal investments 35
Private persons and corpora-
tions on external investments 1,094
1,129
11,019
Miscellaneous items of outgo 67
Net total for items listed above $26,045
Net DEFICIENCY for all trade and service
operations ........
.
$10,357
J 9
If in a year when Puerto Rico had a favorable
visible balance of trade of more than ten million
dollars, it actually turns into an unfavorable balance
when the invisible items are considered, we then wonder
if the tariff protection given by the United States is
beneficial to Puerto Rico.
Settlement of Unfavorable Balance
We have already seen how Puerto Rico had an unfa-
vorable balance o*^ trade when supposedly the opposite
was true. Thise conditions will naturally not hold true
every year, but it is the case in a majority of years.
Professor Rafael de J. Cordero, who gave much
valuable assistance to Diffie and Liffie, in collecting
information for their book, "Porto Rico, A Broken Pledge",
expressed himself in the following manner at a economics
class in the University of Puerto Rico, which the author
attended;
Puerto Rico has no gold mines, no source for filling
the vaults of the treasury. Since we have every year, or
practically every year an unfavorable balance of trade,
payments have to be made. Between England and the United
States, a shipment of gold would clear the balance due,
supposing there no restriction on gold exportation.
Because Puerto Rico ha^ no gold, our only methods of
paying the unfavorable balances is either by borrowing
or by transferring ownership of a part of the land, or
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buildings or other forms of wealth. In this fashion Puerto
Rico continues to pass into the hands of outsiders.
They invest in our land and increase its value, ana
soon we find that the Island is being encouraged towards
further development, even though it has been having
unfavorable balances of trade. The Islsuid increases in
value.
The situation sounds absurd, yet^is reasonable. If
Puerto Rico had favorable balances of trade, it would
naturally show prosperity; if it has not a favorable one,
again the condition tends to be similar, considering that
further investments are made and production must increase.
The only catch to this dilemma is that ownership of the
Island is falling into the hands of outsiders.
Merchant Marine Act of 1920
When Puerto Rico became an American possession, theyPe.pie.
found themselves favored by tariff protection and a new
market, but just as favorable factors came, also unfavor-
able ones appeared and had to be accepted. The Merchant
Marine Act is often criticized in this respect. Under this
Act, "no merchandise shall be transported by water, or by
land and water, on penalty of forfeiture thereof, between
points in the United States including Districts, Territories
and Possessions thereof embraced within the coastwise laws,
either directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of
the transportation, in any other vessel than a vessel built
li'i
vr r
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and documented under the laws of the United States ana
owned by persons who are citizens of the United States,
or vessel to which the privilege of engaging in the
coastwise trade is extended by sections 18 or 22 of this
Act..." (45)
The Act was meant to foster the American Marine.
Since Puerto Rico is an American possession, its trade
depends on American vessels. The freight charges for these
boats are much higher than those of other countries.
The effect of this Act may be noticed in the cost
of transportation of rice, a food product of which Puerto
Rico imported 243,532,018 pounds in 1933. Cuba, ' can
bring rice all the way across from the Pacific at a cost
of only one-tenth of a cent a pound more than the cost
of bringing it from Louisiana to Puerto Rico' . When a
difference of more than 13,000 miles is involved, I believe
"that these " freight charges aire exorbitaint. If conditions
were different, Puerto Rico could save over two million
dollars in freight for rice alone.
As a result of the Act, passenger transportation
between San Juan and New York City is controlled by the
New York and Porto Rico S. S. Co.. They charge exorbitant
rates, about $100 or more for first class cabins. The lack
of freight keeps many steamers from ever entering port in
Puerto Rico. In 1933 the Bunsen Line decided to make stops
at San Juan on the way to South America from New York
City to compete for passenger trajisportation. The news vj<»s
(45) ivlerchant luarine act of 1920, bee. 27,
« a i6 ' ^ ^ Rfi rr
'
1.1'
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gladly received by all islanders. Unfortunately the
first of their boats, inexperienced at entering the
harboi; struck low water, and had difficulty in getting
cut again. Rumors aire that the New York and Porto Rico
S. S. Line paid the Bunsen Line to stay away from the
Island.
Merchant Marine Act Effect on Sugar
The protection afforded by^sugar tariff also suffers
from the effects of the Merchant Marine Act. The high
freight charges Puerto Rico pays are turned into unfavor-
able conditions for sugar exporters, as well as Exporters
crops. Quoting from Clark and Associates: (46)
"In the case of sugar, for example, the Cuban rate
on raw sugar to New York is 10 to 11 cents a hundred,
while the corresponding rate from Puerto Rico is 16 cents
afli OB- refined: sug^i^ the rate from Cuba is around 13
cents gind from Puerto Rico around 21 cents".
Import Duties
Furthermore, Puerto Rico having to ship most of its
products by way of the United States, not only pays highei
freight charges for American boats, but also for greater
distance since they go by way of the States. Again it may
be said that the handling charges of the merchandise
increase expenses tremendously. Import duties on goods
(46) Clark & Associates, P. K. and its Problems, P. 411
3V :
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that sLPrive in Puerto Rico remain in the Island, which
in territories go to the Federal Government C47 ) , but if
the merchandise goes first to an American port, the duties
are turned over to the Treasury of the United States.
Puerto Rico pays higher prices for the merchandise j but
receives no revenue, and this we can say is the condition
in most cases, for even the coffee Puerto Rico imports
comes from the Ignited States, and the United States does
not produce coffee. Coffee imports for Puerto Rico, 1932-
1933, were $71,033. (48)
The Sugar Tariff .
A tariff on Cuban raw sugar of 1.76 cents a pound
had been Puerto Rico's protection up to 1930. An increase
in that tariff was recommended on mainy occasions. The
continental sugar corporations had been exerting pressure
for legislatttre on the matter, as a result of which aji
increase was obtained. To this tariff^ due the rapid
development of the sugar industry in Puerto Rico. The
tso'iff legislation may be visualized from the following
quotations X
"Chairman Hawley of the Committee on Ways and Means
presented the Hawley Tariff bill to the House on May 7,
1929. Provision on the bill to raise the tariff on Cuban
raw sugar from 1.76 cents a pound to 2.40. Oppos^ed by
Cuban sugar interests, who claimed inability to make
(47) The V.'orld Almanac, 1931, P. 521
(48) 33rd Annual Report of the Gov. of P.R., 1933, F. 95.
r ->iifi9V9t on B^visOff'^:
•3
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profits under the already existing rste. " (49)
Failure to approve the bill brought the matter up
again in 193D. The seventy-first Congress, the first reg-
ular session, found Congress with the chief task of revising
the system of the tariffs. The depreciation of currency by
other countries was making it necessary. The sugar bill
action may be seen fron the following quotation:
"The duty on sugar, which ha"; formed one of the
most persistent subjects of Senate controversy, was
finally settled on March 5, by a vote of 47 to 39, This
vote w°s in consideration of action taken January 16, on
which date, by 48 to 33, it had been voted to leave duties
of the Fordney-MeCumber Act unchanged. The action of
March 5 raised the duty on Cuban sugar to 2 cents a oound,
from 1.76 cents, and that on other foreign sugar to 2.50
cents a pound, from 2.20." (50)
On June 18 the tariff bill became effective after
approval by both houses and the President.
The financial condition of Puerto Rico denends
greatly on the tariff, having developed the sugar
industry to an extend where it would bring ruin to the
Island if suddenly removed. That is the danger of the
tariff. It is go d that the American farmer profits by
$59,000,000 annually ,because this hinders its removal.
(49) Dodd , liiead & Co., New Internation-^ 1 Year Boolf, 1929
P. 819
(50) Ibid, 1930, PP. 773-774
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BAivKIi\G AND CkEDIT F-.CILITI1lS
"Of the various factors connected with the bank-
ing process, by all odds the most important is the pur-
suance of a sound lending and investment policy by the
banks themselves. ivioreover, a sound lending and in-
vestment policy must be concerned with liquidity es v/ell
as v;ith safety and yield." (51)
In 1650 Puerto Rico had its first bank. The
London Colonial Bank opened at San Juan, tut after three
years closed again. A second bank was organized shortly
after, but disaster overcame it. llext came the Sociedad
Anonima de Credito iviercantil, which soon became deeply en-
rooted, and was financing the majority of business in the
Island. A later'^organization of this bank transformed it
into the Panco Comercial de Puerto Kico. The development
of banking in Puerto Kico which followed may be pictured
from the following table, taken from Clark and Associates,
Porto Rico and its Problems, Page 376.
GROV;TH OF COIvaiERClAL BAl^KIKG 11^ PORTO RICO
Balance Sheet 1898 1918 1929
Items
Resources: ;!pG,283,464 31,946,875 87,424,216
Cash... 1,772,822 6,009,762 5,094,640
Loans & dis. 2,605,682 17,553,443 64,928,148
Other 1,704,960 8,383,670 17,401,428
Liabilities: 6,283,464 31,946,675 87,424,216
Aggregate Dep. 1,838,783 26,427,135 59,150,075
Cap. & Surplus 1,053,165 3,449,308 11,020,843
Other 3,391,516 2,070,432 17,253,298
( 51 ; Bradford, Banking, P. 469.
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Slnce 1929, banking in Puerto Rioo, like in all
countries has gone through tryinp; periods. From a Con-
solidated Report of Banks (52) and Trust Corananies in
ooeration in Puerto Rico at the close of business June 30,
1933, there are a total of fifteen financial institutions
on the Island. The combined resources of these banks totals
^52,132,604,38. The reduction in resources is understood
considering the hurricanes Puerto Rico has been through and
the heavy withdrawals which consequently followed.
Because they are prominent from a financial and
economic view point, three events deserve to be mentioned,
the closing of the Banco Teritorial Agricola on Sentember 28,
1932, the National Bank Holiday proclaimed by the President
of the United States on March 6 which w?as extended to Puerto
Rico, and the ooening of the Banco de Puerto Rico on May 15,
1933.
BANKS
There are both foreign anddomestic banks in
Puerto Rico. The Bank of Nova Scotia (53) has a branch in
San Juan and Fajardo. The Royal Bank of Canada (54) h^g
branches in San Juan and other towns of the Island The
Natioasl City Bank of Jew York (55) has branches in San
(52) Consolidated Report of Banks, copy obtained from
Nat. City Bank. June 30, 1933.
(53) One Hundred and Second Annual Report by the Bank of
Nova Scotia, December 30, 1933.
(54) Ibid.
(55) Report of James H. Perkins, Cbpirmpn of the Bor irl of
Directors at One-Hundred Twenty-second Annual Meeting
of Shareholders, January 9, 1934
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Juan
,
Arecibo, Bayamon, Caguas, Mayaquez, Ponce, and
Santurce, The- financial backing given to t.iese in-
stitutions by the parent banks make them sound and stable
organizations. These three banks handle the greatest per-
centage of the business transactions of the Island. The Is
land has several small native banks and two American Trust
Companies of little importance. The latest addition I5
the Banco de Puerto Rico, which has taken over the Banco
Comercial de Puerto Rico for liquidation.
Because of the heavy losses suffered by the Is-
land is a consequence of the hurricane that ripped its way
across the northern half of the Puerto Rico during the
nights of September 26-27, 1932 (locally known as "San
Ciprian"), withdrawals from banks were heavy. At the
close of 1933 the following banks werf in receivership
(56) Banco Industrial de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Banco de
Yabucoa, Yabucoa; Rivas Comercial Bank, Ponce; Banco de
Economias del Pueblo, Ponce; and Banco Territorial y
Agricula, San Juan. The Banco Comercial, in receivership
ship previously is not included in this list because the
Banco de Puerto Rico undertook its liquidation.
Unfortunately therc ^.re no saving banks in Puerto
Rico separately organized as such. The commercial bnnks
have however savings departments. A postal savings syfetem
(56) Thirty-third Annual Report of the Gov. of Puerto
Rico, Hon James R. Beverly, 1933. P. 21.
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is in existence, but has not drawn many depositors. This
Postal Savings system should be extended to all p^-rts of
the Island, placing weight on the contention that promotion
of individual drift among the masses is essential. The
Puerto Rican must learn to save.
TKaST COMPANIES
Not until 1925, was any provision made by the
laws to provide for trust ccr.panies. In September of 1928
operations were begun by the first trust company in Puerto
lico, the American Colonial Ban U and Trust Company. It
functions in the city of San Jusn, and in June 30, 1933 it
reported total rf^sources of ;i}i253. 531.23 (57), having
started with $150,579 as total resources.
Later The Trust Gom.pany of Puerto Rico, at San
Juan was organized. Its total resources as of June 30, 1933
wer^ $1000, a fact which is very significant in showing that
it takes very little capital to start a bank in Puerto Rico,
The limited resources are a weakness tha.t should be corrected.
NEED FOR TRUST COMPANIES
The importance of trust coraoanies in Puerto Rico
may be indicated by the fact that on June 30, 1933, saving
bank deposits vi/ere $8,895,709,91 and of these, three banks
had around 75 per cent, or iff6,642. 616. 93. (58)
(57) Consolidated Report of Banks and Trust Companies in
Operation in Puerto Rico, copv made by National City
Bank.
(58) Ibid. Liabilities as of June 30, 1935, Act. No. 18
September 10, 1923.
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These savings accounts by clearing house agree-
ment draw interest at 3 percent or less, and are of suf-
ficient proportions to be invested at better rates.
Private individuals show a tendency to invest
money in mortgages. Thi s. movrmen t has increased in pro-
portion and is remunerative as interest rates of 8 to 14
per cent are charged. The form in which the lender and the
borrower get together is very unsatisfactory. The nros-
pective borrower lets his friends know of his desire to
bori'ow, and his intentions of placing a mortgage on his house
or other property. His friends know of a oerson who desires
to invest ready cash he has available. Proposals are made,
and if they agree, the transaction takes place.
The many inconveniences made the procedure un-
economic. There is difficulty in determining the avail-
able money to be invested. The borrowers, however careful
they may be in their search fca- a lender, have to disclose
their need for money, and this affects their credit stand-
ing. Collections are also inconvenient. It is therefore
obvious that adequate investment agencies need to be es-
tablished.
BANKIMG RESULATIONS
Ivi Organization: - -Five or more people, under full
legal capacity, may organize a bank. (59) An authorized
capital stock of i;?10,000 is the minim.um, of which at least
(59) Act Regulating Banks and Banking in Puerto Rico
and Fixing; the Powers of the treasurer of Puerto Rico.

^3,000 must be paid in before the bank opens fo' business.
Those that have an authorized capital of $100,000 or over,
must pay in 25 per cent before opening for business. The
charter must be approved by the Executive Council and the
Governor, and they in tui'n have the authority to require
amendments of articles of incorporations. Share holders are
not held for double liability. A surplus fund of 50 per cent
of the amount paid in capital is required, to oe accrued from
at least 10 per cent of the annual profits. The amount re-
quired having been reached, further surplus fund is optional.
The one particular regulation on continental or
foreign banks wishing to establish a bank on the Island is
that the narent corporation must be operating in the plr-.ce of
its incorporation.
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
The legal reserve against current liabilities is
20 per cent of demand liabilities. The reserve against these
deposits payable ia not larger than 3 days after demaid, and
is composed of 6.33 per cent of cabh (American money is the
currency used in Puerto Rico), 3.67 per cent as uoper limit
of checks on banks or trust companies on the Island, and the
rest may be deposits in other banks.
POWERS
The banks have much the same powers as banks in
the United States have. They may buy, sell discounts, and
transfer bills of exchange, drafts and other credit papers.

They make loans to the industries, practically financing
the sugar industry. These loans are not to be for more
than 6 months, J'rom Exhibit No. \y> may be seen the
close relation betv/een bank deposits and exports from
Puerto Rico by months. They have moved in harmony, (60)
They may buy local or continental bonds, issue mortgage
bonds secured by real property, yet may not hold this tj^pe
of property for investment.
They are not permitted to issue notes and are
independent of the Federal Reserve System,
II'ISFLCTION
The Insular Treasurer has supervision over the
banks. An examiner may be sent at any time, and if the
bank is unsound, it may be placed in state of liquidation
or in the hands of receivers,
CRITICISM
The fact that a bank may commence to operate
with as little as 4^,000 is the major fault v/ith banking
in Puerto Rico. Such a lovi requirement permits the es-
tablishing of any number of small banks th" t cannot possibly
maintain a sound financial standing, unles::. in- • the hands
of excellent bankers, and no good banker v/ill work in a
bank that has but ;f?3,000. The .rust companies deserve the
same criticism. The minimum capital should be raised to
(60) Exhibit made from data supplied by Exhibit No. 33 of
Thirty-third Annual Report of the Gov, of P, R, 1933.
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in3ure protection to the people of Puerto Rico. Further-
more, no provision is available by which banks may meet
sudden demands for cash. A bank in perfectly sound finan-
cial condition may easily be foi'ced to close, not having
any connection with the Federal Reserve System, by which to
rediscount com.mercial paper of good quality. The Govern-
ment of Puerto Rico found it necessary to make added de-
posits in most of the local banks to assist them in attain-
ing a strong cash position when during this depresnion they
suffered heavy withdrawals. V/hy not make Puerto Rico a new
Federal Reserve District? It would be a district in minia-
ture, and one that would add financial strength to the bank
ing of the Island.
The people of Puerto Kico have long asked for
the establishment of an Insular Bank. Preferable to this
would be a Central Bank that would belong to the Federal
'Reserve System. It is not my purnose to deal with the
soundness of the F. R. S. , which if compared to that of
Canada where not one single failure is on record for many
years, would co-e in for much criticism, but it is my
desire to show that by having a Central Bank, the control
would be facilitated, simplified, made more economical and
sound.
A PLAN
The proposal the author suggests is therefore a
Central Bank. It could be called Banco Central de Puerto
Rico. This bank would serve as clearing house for all the
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member banks of the system. It would rediscount eligible
paper for meirber banks, and serve as a source of supply for
eash to mernb'er banks when they need it. These would be the
important charscteristic s, with special emphasis on the
lest one. What has happened in Puerto Rico during 1932
and 1933 is ample evidence. "The amount of actual cash on
hand (U. S. paper currency, sold, silver, and fractional
coin) on June 30, 1933, was ;-:>4,827,759,92, as against
$2,633,978.75 on June 30, 1932, or an increase of -
12,193,781.17. This remarkable increase is explained by
the fact that during the last fev; months all the banks have
bent every effort to place themselves in a strong cash
position which will oermit them to face any unexpected
demand of the depositors, and also by the fact that the
foreign banks in the Island have received from their home
offices additional cash reserves which they are holding in
their vaults ready for any contingencies." (61)
Merely the thought that the branches of foreign
banks in Puerto Rico have the backing of another bank, a
parent institution, has a psychological effect on the people
that engenders confidence. The Royal Bank of Canada, The
National City Bank and the Bank of Nova Scotia, all three
foreign branches, have by far many more de^-iositors than all
other banks combined.
A Central Bank, besides actually rendering tangibly
valuable services, would create that psychological effect
(61) 33rd Annual Report of the Gov. of P. R. , 1933, P. 24
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needed. That the people have repeatedly «sked for an In-
sular Bank oroves it. An increase in deposits in native
banks would follow.
ISSUE OF CURRENCY
ViHiether the Central Bank should or not be al-
lowed to issue currency comes in for much discussion. It may
be allowed to operate fully as a Federal Reserve Bank. If
the latter, it will naturally have the right to issue paper
money. There is no reason to believe this .vould be un-
sound in Puerto Rico. My only objection is that politicians
may exert pressure and undermine its soundness. This fear
is however eliminated if the supervision of the Federal
Reserve System is had. This, we know, would be the case
if the Central Bank joined the system, as such supervision
is strict in the Federal Reserve System. Native bankers
should be allowed to run the bank. The Bank itself should
be a private institution, and the directors resident citi-
zens.
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PART V
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
In 1920 there were only two parties in the
Island, the Unionist and the Republican parties. The
Socialist party was beginning to develop under the lead-
ership of Santiago Iglesia, a Spaniard, the present Resi-
dent Commissioner to Washington.
The Republican oarty favored a closer union with
the United States, and ultimately statehood. The Unionist
party had for platform complete independence. The con-
servative element was to be found in the Republican party
as a rule, while the other had more liberal tendencies.
Santiago Iglesia was appealing to the workers,
to the m.asses, telling about the oppression exerted on them
by the plantation owners, and the big and nowerful Ameri-
cans and native centrales' executives.
The Unionist party was in control for about ten
yesrs. In the year 1924 they finally relinquished their
stronghold. Their power was being challenged by the Social-
ist party. This party had rapidly grovm and was by 1924
a strong contender.
Mr. Antonio Barcelo, leader of the Unionist party,
realized that the governmental control of his party was
being endangered, due to the development of the Socialist
party. He could not reconcile himself to relinquish this
power, and to present it, he searched for a method by which
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to protect the party and keep the leaders: ip in politics.
He thought it could be done by an alliance between the
Republican and the Unionist p^^rties, the two formerly bit-
ter enemies. He reached an agreement with Mr. Tous Soto,
head of the Republican party by which a merger resulted
of both parties, and a new party was organized, Partido
Alianci sta.
In the mean time, nerhaps due to the influence
of Mr, Tous Soto, Mr. Barcelo was becoming more conser-
vative and the Unionist party abandoned its former plat-
forms for a new one, one that desired for Puerto Rico a
status of autonomy, more self government by the people of
Puerto Rico, yet under the American flag, and in the future
as tcie ultimate solution either statehood or independence.
There was a substantial group of the old Re-
publican party which did not agree with this alliance and
under Mr. Martinez Nadal foimed a party known as the
Pure RetDUblican Party. The-- kepfc their former platform of
pure and absolute statehood. No other alternative or com-
promise satisfied them. This party kept the majority of
the old Republicans vvhile Mr. Tous Soto was followed only
by a handful of voters.
Simultaneously, there was a very small gr cup of
the Unionist party vjhioh WBf^ also dissatisfied with the
alliance and refused to follow Mr. Antonio Bartyelo. They or-
ganized a new party, the Nationalist Party. Their olatform
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was absolute independence ^ and they alleged that Mr,
Barcelo had betrayed the old Unionist party v/hen he made
th^alliance. However, this group was limited in number, the
majority supporting Mr. Antonio Barcelo.
We find therefore, that in 1924, there were
four parties: The Socialist party, v/hich had gone through
this critical evolution v/ithout degenerating , and which had
a great number of adherents amongst the v/orkinp- class,
the "Alianze Puertoriquena" , the Pure Republicans, and the
Nationist party.
The Alianza v/as victorious at the polls and the
same alinement continued until 1928. In this voting year,
the Pure Republicans and the Socialists went. into a huddle^
and made an agreement for electoral purposes. However,
each party maintained its separate idertity. Tl-is nev/ agree-
ment v;as called "Coalicion Republicana .
"
The returns from this election v;ere very close.
The "Alianza'' party had c small majority^ and remained in
control. However, v;hile in power, Mr. Barcelo became dis-
satisfiedwith the"Alianza" as a result of a disagreement
with the leaders of the Republican side of the union. He
left the party, and the majority of his old Unionist adherents
followed him, v/hile a number of the old Unionist Party leaders
remain with the "Alianza". Due to this rupture in the
ranks of the "Alianza" there was a shift in the control of
both legislative houses, the Senate and the House of Re-
presentatives, the "Alianza" was at the time in control.
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Now the Tous Soto Republicans and the Unionist leaders
which had remained inthe alianza reached an accord v/ith
the "Coalicion Republicans", of Socialist and Pure Re-
publicans, and brought about a reorganization of the legis-
lative houses. As a result of this agreement, they managed
to obtaina majority in both houses, and the Barcelo Unionists
v/ere left out entirely. The new political losses elected
Mr, Luis Sanchez Morales, president of the ' Senate
.
In 1932, Mr, Barcelo strengthened the "Liberal
Party" v/hichwas substantially the Unionist party with
the previous complete independence platform. The "Alianza"
then again merged v;ith the Pure Republicans and the new
party was colled "Union Republicana" and triis new "Union
Republicana" party went again into an agreement with the
Socialist Party for electoral purposes.
For 1932, therefore, we again find four parties
ready to go to the polls. They were the Liberal Party,
under Mr, Barcelo, the "Union Republicana", the Socialist
Party, and the Nationalist Party, under the vigorous lead-
ership of avery able politician, Mr, Albiza Campos,
The Nationalist Party, although It had few voteys,
:_a?id.:_ ,h substantially the same platform as the Liberals^
had refused to join them.
In the election of 1932, the coalition of the
Union Republicans and the Socialist party was able to
obtain the majority of the seats in both houses, although
the "Liberal" party had an actual popular majority over
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either one of them separately. The Liberals had 174,000
votes, as against 90,000 by the Socialists and 110,000 by
Republicans. As a result we have the peculiar condition
by which the party with actual populs r major! ty of votes
does not control the house.
The President of the Senate and the President
of the House of Representatives belong to the Union Re-
publicans. They are Mr. Martinez Nadal and Mr. Garcia
Mendez respectively. The Socialist leader, IVir. Santiago
Iglesia was elected Resident Commissioner to Washington.
This confused political alinement is still pre-
valent today.
Going over the political history of Puerto Rico,
we therefore find nmnberous complications, frequent changes
of identity, mergers of parties, political agreements,
which have been due more to political conveniences, and
personal vanity of the leaders than to real conflicts in
principles. This has resulted in an overlooking of the
real economic problems which confront the Puerto Rican
masses. Politics in Puerto Rico is not a m.atter of prin-
ciple or true conviction, but a question of political
manipulations of those whose main consideration is the
preservation of power.
The strike of the students attending the Univer-
sity of Puerto Rico is significant in showing how politics
are in chaotic conditions. Ex-Governor Gore apoointed
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Mr. Rafael Alonso Torres, Socialist leader, '>£ trustee
to the "Junta de Sindicos de la Universidal de Puerto
Rico." The student body objected^ ano since no action
v/as taken they went out on a strike. They claimed "hat
¥ir, Torres was not academically prepared for such a po-
sition^ and t: at a scholarly executive position of thds
nature should hot be made another governmental seat w^ere
a political leader of the majority pamty may v/ait for a
pay check. That Governor Gore had to leave the Island
is in part traceable to this incident. The usual pro-
cedure follo'ved. fie became sick anc returned to the
United States.
Shortly after his resigning. General Blanton
Vjinship v/as appointed Governor. He is at the moment
fulfilling his duties in the Island. His first move
fpiTthe protection of Puerto Rico was to voice nis ob-
jection to the classification of Puerto Rico given by the
Gostiga-Jones proposal, which classified Puerto Rico
as a foreign country.
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SQCIAL CONDITIONS
"The estimated population a s of July 1, 1933,
was 1,323,814 persons or a density of 472.7 per square
mile." This estimate was made by simple arithmetical
calculations using the figures of the census of 1920
and the census of 1930.
"During the calendar year 1932, the birth
rate was 41.5 per thousand as against 41.7 per thou-
sand for the previous calendar year, while the death
rate was 22.3, ss agyinst 20.4 for 1931, and 13.6 for
1930. There was a total of 66,432 births in 1932 and a
total of 35,610 deaths or a net increase in population
of 30,822 persons." (62)
The density in population is indeed large.
Much acrimonious discussion as regards the nooulatlon
question and its economic complication has taken place.
By a majority it is considered a fault that needs correc-
tion, and by some a condition that will correct itself.
The latter group claims that the death rate will in-
crease until a stable condition is reached. Their
claim will indeed hold true if no measures were taken,
but what the wiser Puerto Rican desires are measures to
prevent death resulting from a struggle for life; in
other words, the survival of the fittest. To desire a
stable opoulation is com.mendable after a limit is reached
(62) Thirty-third Annual Report of the Governor of
P. R.
,
1933, P. 7.
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where reasonable comfort and wealth is the noanession of
all, but to allow it to result because of a lack of the
necessities of life is stupid.
Because it is agreed that the nonulation density
of Puerto Rico is too high, measures have been proposed to
correct the conditions. Birth control has some adherents.
The first difficulty that arises is the ethics of the pro-
posal. The people of Puerto Rico being in a majority Cath-
olics, it may be seen that the proposal finds little favor.
Legislation wps sought to legalize and encourage birth
control, but the indi ::;nati on of the people made any such
measure impossible. Emigration is a second r)roposal for
solving the excessive population problem. Already there
have been large scale emigrations financed to Hawaii,
Arizona and Oklahoma, but they have proved a failure from
the point of view of the Puerto Ricans. Sooner or later
it has been necessary to raise funds for the repatriation
of these unfortunnte emigrants. The emigration would be
always encouraged by some concern in need of labor. They
would mate beautiful offers of pay, assistance in establish
ing a home, and numerous other advantages. No sooner had
the emigrants reached their destination than their dreams
would begin to be forever forgotten. As a rule, they
WDUld have to work ten to twelve hours a day, pay would
be miserable and sanitary conditions abominable. Surely
it W!-s ^referable to stay in Puerto Rico than to suffer
these cruelties away from your home. It could not be
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said, as the smigration promoters usually claim that
the trouble was that the Puerto Rican laborers were
too lazy. • Hawaii knov;s that no other worker is more
Industrious, judging from those who went there in the
past
.
The latest onigration pr(Xiosal came from
Florida. The experience from former emigration has
however made the Puerto Rican careful. At the time the
proposal was made, Mr. R. Gore wss Governoe of the Island,
He comes from the state of Florida. In the month of
January 1923, the newspa-^er "La Prensa", published a
series of articles attacking any such em.igration. Dis-
regarding their ifaention of many unfortun*e incidents in
which Latin Americans were abused, and which the author
does not believe should be considered the rule, they had
two strong arguments ag:ainst the suggestion. First,
Florida has little fertile soil and would only offer the
emigrants lots of land that will not produce and secondly,
the people of Florida look down on Latin Am.ericans, more
so if there is negro blood in the person. It is also
mentioned that the emigrants will be made to work in the
proposed sanitation of the Everglades. This should not
be taken, in my belief, as a disadvantage, for work is
what thef need. In my opinion, the "La Prensa" is taking
the wrong point of view in the matter.
However, neither of the above nronosals entirely
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satisfy the author. Birth control is out of the ques-
tion. Emigration c an be encouraged, tut if a party
should go to Florida, the government should take the
matter into its hands to be sure that the emigrants
receive a fair cieal. Decency demands this regulation^
and economy makes it wise for, later, funds v;ill be
necessary to repatriate the emigrants. However, even
if emigration, with proper regulation, should prove satis-
factory, it would aot be sufficient to reduce the popula-
tion of Puerto Rico to a sphere where a sensible stan-
dard of living may be had by all.
Looking at the statistics, we find that in 1929
the number of births registered v/as 52,468; in 1930
54,574; 1932, 66,432. The birth rate is increa- ing ra-
pidly. Discounting the deaths from the birtbs -of 1932,
v.e have an increase of 30,822 persons^ and the death rate
has hardly increased. Therefore, should the increase in popu-
lation remain stable at around 30,000 annually, I do not
believe it possible to form emigration parties to take
care of it and stabilize population. Furthermore, if
stabilized, this will not raise the standard of living
of those left in Puerto Rico.
Vfliat Puerto Rico needs is industries ^ Sources
of revenue that will improve the standard of living,
f^actcries that will give v/ork to the Puerto Ricans.
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Puerto Rico has the labor, and has the possibilities
for industries; sugar refineries, cotton mills, clay
molding, gasoline refining, cigarettes and cigar manu-
facturing, fruit canning and fruit growing, are only a
few of the possibilities, rend every effort In this
development. A higher standard of living usually brings
a smaller birth rate, and a lower rate, in turn, permits
a higher standard of living. The United States is far
from reaching a density of population comparable to that
of Puerto Rico^and yet, reports are that by 1940, the
population will cease to increase and remain stable at
about 133,000,000 persons. Vvbiy? Because the standard
of living is higher. The ps^/chology of the question does
not matter, it is the effect v/hich I notice ,and what in
turn deserves consideration relative to Puerto Rico,
Attempts to correct the population problem in Puerto
Rico by other methods than by improving the standard of
living will only be partial;! t iwlll belike closing a
faucet of v;ater that threatens to fill the room v/ith
v/ater, and yet allov/ others to remain open^-
YiAGES
It has been seen that Puerto Rico suffers from
over population. Vvhat makes this assertion plausible is
that standards of living are low. V^e therefore come to
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the question of wages. As an average, v/ages in Puerto
Rico are higher than in Cuba and several other countries,
Hov/ever, this fact should not mislead us. Cost of living
is higher in Puerto Rico.
The efforts of the N R A to raise its prices in
the United States have had a marked effect in Puerto Rico.
Since most of the merchandise imported by Puerto Rico is
imported from the United States, the island is forced to
pay higher prices, and yet, the wages of the islander are
low. A maid's v/age is $10.00 or less a month. Should
she get .#10. 00, she has to clothe herself and ofte'JV sup-
port a family. She, however, is fortunate ;for she has
room and board given to her.
Wages prevailing in the building trade are higher.
In San Juan, a master receives from $2,50 to $7 ,77 a day,
masons $1«50 to $4.33; carpenters, $1.25 to .;?4.00; painters,
$1.50 to v3.60; electricians, ^^2,00 to C?5.00; plumbers,
|2.00 to $5.00; and helpers, $.83 to $1.17.
Labor does not go on strike for the excitement
of if, it has a reason for doing so, and that reason is
usually wages. To understand, therefore, the labor con-
ditions, v;hat would be better than to review the strikes
of labor during 1932 and 1933?
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STRIKES
In the sugar cane industry during 1932 and 1935
(63) there v/ere 19 strikes; 8 in the tobacco industry; and
9 in needlework. The total industrial strikes for one
year totalled 46. VJhen 46 strikes take place in one year,
surely there must be a reason,
REHABILITATION
There is an organization in Puerto Rico that is
doing extensive rehabilitation v/ork. The people call it
"La Rehabilitadora, " its official name being "Adminlstra-
cion de Axilio de Emergencia." The organization began to
function in August of 1933. At its head is Mr. James R.
Bourne. '»Vithin this organization, v/e find Liais Pales Matos
in charge of the Public V/orks. To supply work to the ap-
palling number of unemployed in the Island, construction
of the follov/ing municipal roads has been undertaken:
T0\;^ m\ME OF ROAD LENGTH IN APFROPRI-'.TION
Kilos
Vieques Puerto Diablo — - —
Humacao Anton Ruiz 4 $30,240.00
Ceiba Rio Abajo 4 28,750.00
Aguas Euenas Jagueyes 5 22,334.00
Comerio Paloma 4 50,516.00
San Lorenzo Florida 2 14,099.00
There are appropriations for other roads which
have not as yet been started.
The Administration rave the Department of Health
$126,000.00 to combat malaria. This amount is to be
(63) Ibid - page 73
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augmented as the occasion arises. The efforts of the
Department of, Health are centered around the zones of
Vega Baja, Toa Alto, Hatillo, San Juan, Rio Piedras,
Catano, Fajardo, Naguabo, Guayama, San Germain, Mayaquez,
Salinaa, and Santa Isabel, where, according to health
statistics, health conditions need more assistance. The
malaria germs concentrate in those areas where humidity
is greatest. To destroy these pools of contamination,
water outlets are being dug.
Swamps are being filled, and drainage systems
installed. These v/ill not only improve the sanitary con-
ditions of the Island, but v/ill furnish employment to
thousands •
Sewing work is also being done by the Red Cross;
308,000 yards of cloth v/ere made to distribute among the
poor. Over 4,000 women are employed in this task, being
paid 91*00 per day. To obtain a wider distribution of
this money, no laborer is allowed to earn over spS-OO per
week.
Food distribution also comes in for commendable
mention. Three pounds of foodstuff is being given to every
family of from one to four members, and six pounds if the
family has five or more members.
One enterprise undertaken by the organization
that may prove extremely valuable for the Island is the
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analysis of the soil in search for possilble mineral de-
posits. The technicians claim to have already found
rich deposits of magnesium near Juana Diaz sufficiently
promising to be mined a large scale. It would surely
help Puerto Rico if it were found that it v;as rich in
mineral deposits.

a4*
PART VI
CONCLUSION
It, i3 impossible to deny that Puerto Rico
needs reorganization. The Island had huge profits
when the boom period was on, but now that it h^-^s been
caught in the whirlpool of depression, the mistakes
stand our more vividly and the people are more willing
to reason.
The coietntion of many Puerto Ricans is that
sugar is doing harm to the Island, because it han such
tyrannic control over its destiny and it drives other
crops out of existence. They contend Puerto Rico should
dimish its production.
It is futile in my belief to attempt to
control the sugar industry as long as it brings large
profits. That it may drive out other crops does not
make it a monster, for precisely the fact that it
displaces other crops shows that it brings greater
margin of profit and that i s indeed to be desired.
The industry does not take all the creage of the
Island anyway. There is room for many other crops and
I agree Puerto Rico is in dire need of them*. Other
industries that diversify, that may be intercropped,
that will stabilize the Island's income and balance
seasonal unemployment are necessary.
The sugar industry is developed to a degree
far beyond that which it could maintain on a profitable ba
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If the sugar tariff were revised and either lowered jt
removed. Here lies the danger of the industry. V/hat
politics may do is difficult to predict. The present
proposal before the legislature for a revision of the
sugar tariff may mean ruin or assure protection for the
Island. Here, therefore, we must admit the worth of
diversification of industries in Puerto Rico. Tr.ey
would be a I'.fe saver to Puerto Rico should it be
left without the sugar tariff protection, and again
would supply employment to many who are in extreme
need of it.
I do not wish to be misunderstood. It is not
my contention that other industries are recommended even
if they are profitless, merely because they help em-
ployment and would help to stabilize the Island's income.
They need to be profit bearing enterprises to warrant
existence. Many of them have already been proven to
be financially successful and others thfit are in pro-
cess of organization or reorganization shav promise.
An engineering feat that is being considered is the
construction of a dry dock by Fundicion Abarca. I assure
satisfactory profits from it if the plan comes true, and
I have reason to believe it will.
The over population problem in Puerto Rico is
one that at the moment is most commented upon. Already
have I given my criticism on the matter while directly
referring to the problem, but I wish to reemphasize that

the condition will not be solved by birth control or
emigration. Industrialization will however bring relief.
A higher standard of living will in turn bring about a
smaller birth rate. It is said there is overproduction of
wheat when the inprket is not able to absorb the supoly,
when the demand plus ability to buy sre insufficient.
Over-population is that stage of density of persons to
the square mile where the sources of revenue are insuf-
ficient to take care of all adequately. Puerto Rico is
over-populated in prooortion to its present income, but
if this income is improved, the phrase will not hold true.
It should be then clesr that w'':-at needs to be accomplished
is to increase the Islands' income and create a standard
of living that will automatically regulate population.
Further criticism on the Puerto Rico economic
conditions may be made in reference to taxes. They are
too high, and the government expenditures extravagant.
We find at present two schools of reasoning as to how
to come out of a depression. One recommends economy,
the other increases in expenditures. Needless tomention,
the United States hR s followed the latter, while England as
an exam.ple, h8s clung to the first theory. The author
supports economy. We may come out of a depression by
reckless expenditures, but I am sure the sounder theory
is that which maintains expenditures within limits.
Puerto Rico is choking with debts, and yet the government
is constantly in search of a new name to place on a
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Commiasion for which to m^ke a new appropriation. It is
high time a sounder policy was adopted.
Should the politicians find enjoyment in
establishing coininissions and boards, why don't they
look into the banking situation and strengthen its
basis? Banking in Puerto Rico i s in no hectic peri:>d
nor in extreme need for alteration, but surely could
withstand a lot of improvement. The depression left
sufficient proof to the fact. That a bank may start
operation with only $3,000 in the vaults in indeed
something that calls for correction. To add strength
to banking in Puerto Rico a Central Bank is recommended.
The matter was discassed in detail previously.
Other criticisms of secondary importance
have been made directly after dealing with a problem
in the thesis. To avoid excessive repetition I will
not discuss them again.
As a final v;ord, it should be mentioned that
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt is in Puerto Rico at present
(March 1934) on an inspection trip. Her visit will
center the eyes of the world on the Island. She will
no doubt report to kr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and I am
quite sure that it will result in, monetary remittances
for further rehabilitation work on the Island. The
profits the United States gets out of the Island warrant
these remittances and many more.
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COFFEE SEEDS BEDS
1. Coffee seed beds -Puerto Rico Hurricane Helief
Commission.
(a) Number of seed beds pending distribution of
June 30, 1932 37
(b) Total number of seedlings from these beds
distributed during this year 2,245,700
2. Puerto Rican Hurricane Relief Commission's coffee
seed beds during year:
(a) Number of seed beds 24
(b) Total area (acres) 13.15
(c) Total number of seedlings from these seed
beds distributed during the year 301, uOO
(d) Total number of seedlings that will be
distributed after June 30, 1933 1,988,015
(e) Number of nurseries made this year in farm*
er's plantations 405
(1) Number of seedlings in same 1,880,400
3. Total area of land that can be covered with the
seedling distributed during the year (acres) 3,545.16
4. Other coffee seed beds made during the year:
(a) Number of seed beds made by the farmers in
which this Bureau has not participated
directlv 163
(1) Number of seedlings in same 6,037,000
(b) Number of seedlings made by the personnel
of the Bureau atnd considered as services
in farms 37
(1) Total number of seedlings in same-1,302,125
5. Total area of land that can be covered in the
coffee zone with seedlings produced in seed
beds made by the personnel of this Bureau and
with those made by farmers individually in
(acres) 5,508.00
COFFEE PRUNING
1. Number of services in renewal pruning 27
(a) Total area that will cover these services
(acres) 28.65
2. Total area of renewal pruning in coffee feu:'ms
not considered services (acres) 1,060
3. Number of services in pruning by the Colombia
System 20
(a) Total area of these services (acres) 42.30
COFFEE MODEL PLANTINGS
1. Number of demonstrations in model planting with
methods of cultivation (erosion control) 14
(a) Total area in demonstration (acres) 45.75
# Copied from Thirty-third Annual Report of the
Governor of Puerto Rico, 1933, p. 114.
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INSULAR GOVERMENT EXPEiiLITUKES COl/iPAREL WITH
POPULATION AND VOLUME OF TRALE, TAKING 1916 AS BASE
Gov't £x/>ef7//fuf^e^ ^ l^o/onie of Trc^c/e.
'tfOQ
111^-1115
«lx1J1l^i tlJ2NJf
Population 1,209,910 1,454,000 1,623,814
Volume of Trade 83,241,203 196,877,068 130,162,166
Expenditures 8,764,165 26,398,277 24,336,233
Note:- Expenditures comprise both Insular Revenues and
Trust Funds exclusive of repayments and transfers.
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BANCO DE PUERTO RICO
Opened for business May 16th. 1933
'^'"^m ;jBANCO DE PUERTO RICO
-_i :
BALANCE DE SITUACION AL CIERRE DE OPERACIONES EL 30 DE
SEPTIEMBRE DE 1933.
ACTIVO PASIVO
PRESTAMOS Y DESCUENTOS $147,175,01 ' CAPITAL PAGADO , $367,141.99
GASTOS ANTICIPADOS 2,211.86 ' CUENTA DE BENEFICIOS 5.451.09
GASTOS GENERALES 2,965.00 ' DEPOSITOS 318.370.09
GASTOS DE ORGANIZACION 3,820.45
OTROS ACTIVOS 4,439.54
EFECTIVO EN CAJA $90,097.52
EN PODER DE BA NCOS.
.. .440,253.79 530,351.31
$690,963.17 $690,963.17
EL ESTADO PRECEDENTE DEMUESTRA UN ACTIVO DE $690,963.17 CONTRA UN PASIVO DE DEPOSITOS
ASCENDENTE A $318,370.09 EXISTIENDO UN BALANCE EN EXCESO DE LOS DEPOSITOS DE S372. 593.08 I NTE-
GRADO PRINCIPALMENTE POR EL CAPITAL PAGADO DE $367,141.99. QUE REPRESENTA UN MARGEN
ADICIONAL DE GARANTIA Y SEGURIDAD PARA NUESTROS DEPOSITA NTES
.
ESTE BANCO SE HA HECHO CARGO DEL ACTIVO Y PASIVO DEL BANCO COMERCIAL DE PUER-
TO RICO SOLAMENTE PARA SU LIQUIDACION.
H. L COCHRAN
VICE
- PRESIDENTE Y GERENTE
PAGAMOS EL 3% EN EL DEPARTAMENTO DE AHORROS.
VENDEMOS CARTAS DE CREDITO Y CHEQUES DE VIAJEROS DEL AMERICAN EX PRES COMPANY
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